DEFENSES TO SECTIONS 2(c),
2(d), AND 2(e) OF THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT.
A recent Supreme Court interpretationof the Robinson-Patman
Act which, for the first time, required a seller to extend
proportionally equal promotional aid to buyers at different
functional levels, illustrates the uncertain nature of the scope,

and, concomitantly, the defJnses to sections 2(c), 2(d) and 2(e) of
the Act. This note attempts to explicate the defenses that have
been successfully used to rebut charges under these sections.
Special emphasis is placed upon clearly delineating the elements
of court and FTC favored defenses on both the merits and
jurisdictionalgrounds to charges of section 2(c), 2(d) and 2(e)
violations.
Federal Trade Commission study conducted in the early 1930's
revealed that large volume buyers frequently utilize their immense purchasing power to disadvantage smaller competitors by obA

taining unearned concessions from their common supplier.' In order to
eliminate such indirect price reductions, 2 Congress enacted sections

2(c), (d), and (e) in the Robinson-Patman Amendments to the
IFTC, FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATION, S. Doc. No. 4,74th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1935). The study is replete with examples of buyers demanding payments for illusory
brokerage services, discounts, allowances and outright price reductions. Id. at 25, 63. The
Commission found that 15% of the selling price differential between chain stores and non-chain
stores was attributable to the former's powerful bargaining position. Id. at 55. However, the
finaings of this report have been criticized as failing to accurately estimate the lower operating
costs of chains. See Adelman, Price Discrimination as Treated in the Attorney General's
Report, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 222, 232 (1955).
2 Attempts by the FTC to use the original Clayton Act § 2, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), to
restrain price reductions induced by buyers failed because the courts narrowly interpreted the
purpose of the Act as the protection of competition only between the seller and his competitors.
See, e.g., National Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299 F. 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 613 (1924);
Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 F. 774 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 759 (1923). For a general
discussion of the background of the Robinson-Patman Amendments see W. PATMAN, COMPLETE
GUIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 1-11 (1963) [hereinafter cited as PATMAN]; F. ROWE,
PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN

[hereinafter cited as ROWE].

ACT ch. 1, 3-23 (1962, Supp. 1964)
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Clayton Act.' Section 2(c)4 outlaws indirect price reductions
accomplished through the payment of "dummy" brokerages.' Thus,
the payment or receipt of a direct commission, brokerage, or other

compensation as well as "discounts in lieu thereof" are prohibited
unless earned by the actual performance of distributive services.6 To
Robinson-Patman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 730 (1914). See
generally Comment, TheRobinson-PatmanAct in Action, 46 YALE L. REV. 447 (1937).
1 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce...
to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other
compensation, or any allowances or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered, in
connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares or merchandise, either to the other party to
such transactions or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such
intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any
party to such transactions other than the person by whom such compensation is so granted or
paid." See generally Michael, Brokerage and the Robinson-PatmanAct, 10 LOYOLA L. REV.
165 (1961); Oppenheim, Administration of the Brokerage Provision of the Robinson-Patman
Act, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 511, 516-520 (1940); Comment, Some Aspects oflnterpretationand
Application of the Brokerage Clause of the Robinson-Patman Act, 10 DEPAUL L. REV. 65
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 10 DEPAUL L. REV.]; Note, 41 NOTRE DANtILAW.
355 (1966).
The practice of large buyers in demanding that the seller pay "brokerage" to "dummy"
brokers who were employed by the buyers and rendered no services to the seller was apparently
the primary target of the Act. FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 169 (1960). See also S.
REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15
(1936); note 6 infra. The recognition of this narrow purpose of the brokerage clause has been
significant in recent determinations that a "services rendered" defense should be available to any
defendant charged under the Act. See Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v. American Viscose Corp., 364
F.2d 491 (1966), rev'g 354 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Hruby
Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1429, 1447 (1962); Flotill Prods. Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP.
16970, at 22,047 (FTC 1964); notes 35-38 infra and accompanying text.
The Congressional report on the bill ultimately enacting § 2(c) emphasizes that the provision
.. permits payments of a compensation by a buyer to his broker or an agent for services
actually rendered in his behalf; likewise, by a buyer to his broker or agent for services in
connection with the purchase of goods actually rendered in his behalf; but it prohibits the direct
or indirect payment except for such services rendered." H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 15 (1936). The section's singular interest in dummy brokerage was further underscored by
Senator Logan, Chairman of the Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee: "The bill
does not affect legitimate brokerage either directly or indirectly. Where the broker renders
service to the buyer or to the seller the bill does not prohibit the payment of brokerage. It is not
aimed at legitimate brokerage, because brokerage is necessary. . . . However, it was found that
while direct price discrimination could not be indulged in, the buyer, if he were sufficiently
powerful, could designate someone and say, 'that is my broker'. . . . The buyer would say to
the seller, 'you must sell through that man, and you must pay him a certain percentage or
amount of brokerage'; and when the so-called broker or dummy broker received what was paid,
he turned it over to the buyer, and in that way a price discrimination was brought about." 80
CONG. REc. 6281 (1936).
Representative Celler foresaw possible misinterpretations of the scope of § 2(c). "The
conference report, in its reference to brokerage allowances, fails to take due notice of the fact
that we put into the final bill the words 'except for services rendered.' That means if actual
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combat the practice of giving lower prices through selective payments
for promotional services or facilities, 7 section 2(d) requires that such
payments be available on proportionally equal terms to all
customers.' This "proportionally equal" criteria also determines a
brokerage service is rendered it must be allowed to be paid for; it must be either reflected in
price or discount and allowance. Many respectable and honorable business houses have brokerage departments or have organized separate entities which they may own in whole or in part
and which perform legitimate brokerage functions; which departments or entities expend
money in research, investigation, experimentation, advertising. They actually render valuable
brokerage service. Yet if they be directly or indirectly connected with the seller or buyer, no
brokerage allowance can be made, although in the language of the words we inserted services
were actually rendered. I know that everybody watching the bill and interested in making it
sound has assumed that the insertion of the words 'for services rendpred' meant that payment
could be made whenever services were actually rendered." 80 CONG. REc. 9420 (1936)
(emphasis added).
Representative Celler's concern was subsequently proven justified as § 2(c) became one

'ofthe most active producers of litigation under the Act. See Note, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 355,
356 (1966). See generally C. AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (3d ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as AUSTIN]; Michael, supra note 4.

Because of the early decisions negating the services rendered exception, see note 21 infra and
accompanying text, the precise nature of the services that would warrant legitimate brokerage
payment have never been described. Early attempts by defendants to defend against section 2(c)
violations, which were unsuccessful because of the buyer-seller relationship of the parties,
indicate that such services as the broker's selection of a seller for a buyer, information
concerning present market prices and conditions, examination and testing of commodities, and
descriptions of goods may be the type of services that will constitute "services rendered." See
Oliver Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763, 766 (4th Cir. 1939); Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96
F.2d 687, 693 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938). More recently, proof of similar
services rendered has successfully relieved a defendant of liability for a seller-buyer brokerage.
See notes 34-37 infra and accompanying text.
' "Still another favored medium for the granting of oppressive discrimination is found in the
practice of large buyer customers to demand, and of their sellers to grant, special allowances in
purported payment of advertising and other sales-promotional services, which the customer
agrees to render with reference to the seller's product or sometimes with reference to his business
generally. Such an allowance becomes unjust when the service is not rendered, the payment is
grossly in excess of its value, or when in any case the customer is deriving from it benefit to his
own business and is thus enabled to shift to his vendor substantial portions of his own
advertising cost, while his smaller competitor, unable to command such allowance, cannot do
so." H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1936); S. REP. No. 1502,74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1936).
' 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to
pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such
person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for any services or
facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection with the processing, handling, sale
or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by
such persons, unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms
to all other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities." See
generally Comment, Recent Problems Under Section 2(d) of the Robinson-PatmanAct, 29 U.
CHI. L. REV. 160 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 29 U. CHI. L. REV.]. As explained by
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seller's obligation to his buyers under section 2(e) if the seller himself

furnishes the promotional services or facilities.' Although certain
defenses were specifically made available to the contemporaneously

enacted prohibition upon direct price discrimination embodied in
section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 0 the proscriptions upon the
indirect methods of discrimination were phrased in more unqualified
terms. However, the imprecision of the language of sections 2(c), (d),
and (e)" has left the exact scope of their prohibitions against indirect
Representative Utterback, chairman of the Senate-House conferees: "The existing evil at which
this part of the bill is aimed is, of course, the grant of discriminations under the guise of
payments for advertising and promotional services, which, whether or not the services are
actually rendered as agreed, result in an advantage to the customers so favored as compared with
others who have to bear the cost of such services themselves." 80 CoNG. REC. 9418 (1936).
1 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of
one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale with or
without processing,. . . by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected
with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon
terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms." For a discussion of
sections 2(d) and 2(e), see PATMAN, ch. 4; ROWE, ch. 13; Kintner,
and Services: Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the
41 NOTRE DAME LAW.
364 (1966).
"115 U.S.C. § 13(a) provides in pertinent part: "[I]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce, . . .either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality,. .. where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided,
That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or
quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered: . . .
That nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes from time to time
where in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the
goods concerned, such as but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable
goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith
in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned."
PATMAN at 11-101; ROWE
41 NOTRE
at 87-204; Blackford,
DAME LAW. 285 (1966); Note, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 317 (1966). The proscriptions of section 2(a) are limited by section 2(b): "Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint
under this section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished,
the burden of rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon
the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination:
That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima
facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities
to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor."
Mayer,
41 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 310 (1966). See notes 173-90
and accompanying text.
" Mr. Justice Frankfurter has noted that "precision of expression is not an outstanding
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discrimination unsettled. Consequently, the nature and validity of

defenses to these sections remain unclear.
SECTION 2(C)-THE BROKERAGE CLAUSE

The Federal Trade Commission and the courts initially took the
position that the statutory defenses against section 2(a) charges of
direct price discrimination-cost justification, 2 good faith meeting of
competition,"3 and lack of competitive injury 4 to or discrimination
among buyers' 3-were unavailable to a party charged with a
brokerage clause violation. 6 This more rigid treatment of an alleged
violator of section 2(c) cannot be justified on the basis that the
consequences of a brokerage clause violation are more reprehensible
than those stemming from a violation of section 2(a) since the

ultimate economic effect of a violation of either section, a reduction of
the buyer's cost, is equivalent.

Rather, the restriction of effective

defenses to section 2(c) was intended to promote regulatory efficiency
by forcing the parties to confine their predatory practices to overt

price differentials encompassed within section 2(a) on the theory that
such direct discriminations were more readily detectable.' 8
characteristic of the Robinson-Patman Act... " Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61,
65 (1953). This statement has been described as a "generous. . .understatement" by those who
consider "section 2(c) . . .a prime example of nonintelligible draftsmanship." See Note, 41
NOTRE DAME LAW. 355 (1966).
"See notes 60-75 infra and accompanying text.
Ii See notes 173-90 infra and accompanying text.
"See notes 169-72 infra and accompanying text.
"See notes 27-32 infra and accompanying text.
6 "It is perfectly clear that all three of these practices [described in 2(c), (d)
and (e)] were
forbidden because of their tendency to lessen competition and create monopoly, without regard
to their effect in a particular case; and there is no reason to read into the sections forbidding
them the limitations contained in section 2(a) having relation to price discrimination .... "
Great At. &Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940),
citing Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763, 766-68 (4th Cir. 1939) (dicta); accord,Southgate
Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607, 610 (4th Cir.) (dicta concerning competitive injury), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945); Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
310 U.S. 638 (1940); Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 634 (1938); see Oppenheim, supra note 4, at 520-26.
11Obviously, the effective cost of the purchased product is reduced equally by an initial cut in
price or by a rebate of the price paid in the form of brokerage for illusory services. Thus, the
activities proscribed by § 2(c) differ only from the price discriminations of § 2(a) in the methods
used to obtain the effect. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO
STUDY ANTITRUST LAWS, 191-92 (1955) [hereinafter cited as ATT'y GEN. REP.]; cf. Note,
48 VA. L. REV. 574, 595 (1962). But see notes 170-72 infra and accompanying text.
11"[O]ne of the principal evils inherent in the payment of brokerage fees by the seller to the
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The proscriptions of section 2(c) as originally promulgated
apparently were not absolute, for the text of that section excludes

compensation paid "for services rendered" from the stigma of
illegitimate brokerages. 9 Nevertheless, early judicial decisions
emasculated this "services rendered" exception, 0 ruling that the
buyer or his agent could not, as a matter of law, perform the services
contemplated by the provision.2 The rationale for this ban upon sellerbuyer brokerage payments was that the conflicting interests of the

buyer and seller in a sales transaction would make it impossible for
either party to faithfully and effectively serve the other's interest.2
Consequently, the courts reasoned that Congress necessarily intended
buyer directly or through an intermediary, is the fact that this practice makes it possible for the
seller to discriminate in price without seeming to do so. If a price discount is given as a
brokerage payment to a controlled intermediary, it may be and often is concealed from other
customers of the seller. One of the main objectives of section 2(c) was to force price
discrimination out into the open where they would be subject to the scrutiny of those interested
.
... Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F. 2d 687, 692 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634
(1938); see Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607, 609, 610 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,326
U.S. 774 (1945); Elman, The Robinson-Patman Act and Antitrust Policy: A Time for
Reappraisal,42 WASH. L. REV. 1,23 (1966).
"See 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1964) (supranote 4); H.R. REP. No. 287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 15
(1936), comments of Senator Logan, 80 CONG. REc. 6281 (1936), and comments of
Representative Celler, 80 CONG. REC. 9420 (1936) (supranote 6).
"See generally Bison, The "Services Rendered" Provision in the Brokerage Section of the
Robinson-PatmanAct, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 326 (1966).
21See Bison, supra note 20, at 327. The "services rendered" wording was confined by the Fifth
Circuit to the preceding "allowance or discount" terminology, causing all brokerage payments
to purchasing parties to be considered per se illegal. Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d
268 (5th Cir. 1940). Further, the Third Circuit ruled that 2(c) was an absolute prohibition of
price reductions or brokerage payments between the parties or their agents, thus outlawing all
seller-buyer brokerage compensation in any form. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.
2d 667, 673, 674-75 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940); see e.g., Oliver Bros.,
Inc. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939); Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d,
Cir.), cert. denied,305 U.S. 634 (1938).
The effect of this restriction of the "services rendered" defense in addition to the refusal to
accord defenses available under § 2(a) to § 2(c), see note 16 supra and accompanying text, gave
the brokerage clause a per se proscriptive quality. See Note, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 355, 356-57
(1966). This result received intense criticism by commentators on the ground that it
discouraged competition, an effect contrary to the intent of the antitrust laws in general and, in
fact, gave independent brokers a monopoly. See, e.g., ROWE 539-55; Elman, supra note 18, at 23.
25; Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust
Policy, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139, 1205-07 n.178 (1952); notes 24, 54, 57 infra and accompanying
text.
2 For example, the Third Circuit concluded: "Conflicting interests are always engaged when
an attempt is made by buyers and sellers to arrive at a market price for commodities. We
entertain no doubt that it was the intention of Congress to prevent dual representation by agents
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the proscription of section 2(c) to be absolute, concluding that the
allowance of brokerage payments between a buyer and seller would
lead to such "fraud and oppression" as to destroy the effectiveness of
the amendment in curtailing indirect price discrimination. 23 As a
result of these decisions, only independent brokers could lawfully
receive brokerage, as they alone served only one party's interest.24
Despite this detrimental effect, the absolute interpretation of section
2(c) received universal acceptance2 5 until the Supreme Court's
purporting to deal on behalf of both buyer and seller. . . .[Thus,] [t]he agent cannot serve two
masters . . . ." Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667, 674 (3d Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940). See generally Elman, note 18 supra, at 23; 51 HARV. L. REV. 1303
(1939); 7 U. Cm. L. REV. 189 (1939); 47 YALE L.J. 1207 (1939). More recently, the First Circuit
has echoed this distrust of such seller-buyer cooperation: "[W]e would be naive if we believed
that buyers would have any great solicitude for the welfare of their commercial antagonists,
sellers. The seller wants the highest price he can get and the buyer wants to buy as cheaply as he
can, and to achieve their antagonistic ends neither expects the other, or can be expected, to lay all
his cards face up on the table." Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 55-56 (Ist Cir. 1964). See
Bison, supra note 20, at 327-30.
23The argument that a seller's payment of brokerage could be justified when made for services
rendered was rejected on the ground that "[tihe construction contended for makes much of its
[brokerage clause] language meaningless; it does violence to the purpose of the Act and has been
explicitly rejected in other circuits. It is plain enough that the paragraph [section 2(c)], taken as
a whole, is framed to prohibit the payment of brokerage in any guise by one party to the other,
or the other's agent.
...
Quality Bakers of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393, 398 (1st Cir.
1940); Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667, 674 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 625 (1940). See notes 34-58 infra and accompanying text.
" The immediate effect was to give the independent broker a virtual monopoly of the
brokerage services market. See note 21 supra. In common sales transactions between sellers and
small buyers, brokerage services are required to distribute the goods, usually shipped in large
quantities, to the individual small buyer. The cost of these services are always upon the buyer,
either in cost of the broker he hires or in the seller's price which reflects seller's payments to his
own broker. Under the interpretation of 2(c) provided by Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106
F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940), see note 21 supra, the buyers who are
too small individually to perform brokerage services for themselves will not be encouraged to
form cooperative associations to perform the services because they would be unable to recover
from the seller, either through direct payments or through discounts in price, the cost of
performing these services. Thus, the independent wholesaler becomes the sole distributor to
small buyers, and, as a result, the price which these small buyers must pay to the seller is higher
than the cost incurred by a fully integrated company because the former's price reflects the profit
element of the independent retailer's charge while the latter's reflects only the cost of
distributing. Therefore, contrary to the intent of Congress, the small buyer is placed in a
disadvantageous competitive position vis-a-vis the integrated firm because the small buyer's
price to the consumer will be higher, reflecting his higher payments for distribution. See A-r'Y
GEN. REP at 190; RowE at 355-56; Elman, note 18 supra, at 23-25.
1 See, e.g., Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
774 (1945) (professional brokers purchasing for their own retail accounts); Modem Mktg. Serv.,
Inc. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945); Quality Bakers of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393 (lst
Cir. 1940); Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634
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decision in FTC v. Henry Broch & Co.26
27
In Broch the Court significantly weakened the "perse thrust" of
section 2(c) by implying that only unjustified discriminatory
payments of brokerage were banned. 28 An independent broker,
employed by a seller, was found to have violated section 2(c) by

reducing the commission charged the seller and thereby enabling the
latter to lower his price to the one buyer who had refused to deal at the
seller's previously quoted price.29 However, in dicta, the Court stated
(1938) (payment to market information service of buyers.).
26363 U.S. 166 (1960) (5-4 decision). See generally RowE, at 343-46; Rill, Brokerage Under

the Robinson-Patman Act: Toward a New Certainty, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 337 (1966);
Comment, 10 DEPAUL L. REV. at 75-84; Comment, 42 N.C.L. REV. 457 (1964); Comment,
Brokerage and the Broch Case: Conflict and Compromise Between Sections 2(a) and 2(c) of the
Robinson-PatmanAct, 28 U. Cm. L. REV. 505 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 28 U.
Cm. L. REV.]; 46 IOWA L. REV. 700 (1961); 13 STAN. L. REV. 133 (1960).
27 363 U.S. at 189 (dissent). For a discussion of the argument of the dissent of Broch see note
29 infra and accompanying text.
2
1The limitation of § 2(c) to discriminatory payments may be inferred from the emphasis in
Broch upon that characteristic of illegal brokerage. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing the majority
opinion, first decided that ". . . the act is aimed at price discrimination. . . "Id. at 174. This
statement may be interpreted to mean that 2(c) is applicable to price reductions or brokerage
only if discriminatory; that is, if preference in price is given to favored buyers. See Empire
Rayon Yarn Co. v. American Viscose Corp., 364 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,385 U.S.
1002 (1967); Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C 1437 (1962). Mr. Justice Douglas then stated that the
decision in Broch did not mean that ". . . every reduction in price, coupled with a reduction in
brokerage, automatically compels the conclusion that an allowance 'in lieu' of brokerage has
been granted. As the Commission itself has made clear, whether such a reduction is tantamount
to a discriminatorypayment of brokeragedepends on the circumstances of each case." 363 U.S.
at 175-76 (emphasis added). The term discrimination, or its concomitants "preference" and
"concession," appear ten times in the opinion.
It has been contended that this emphasis upon discrimination is wholly correct and consistent
with the language of the section which may be defined as "a corrollary provision of an
antidiscrimination statute." Rill, supra note 26, at 338. It is also relevant to note the basic
objectives of the Robinson-Patman Act: "The object of the bill. . . is to amend section 2 of the
Clayton Act so as to suppress more effectually discriminationsbetween customers of the same
seller . . . .Such discriminationsare sometimes effected directly in prices, including terms of
sale; and sometimes by separate allowances to favored customers for purported services which
are unjustly discriminatoryin their result against other customers. The Bill is accordingly drawn
in six lettered subsections, of which the first four, (a), (b), (c), (d), contain substantive measures
...
H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th
directed at the more prevalent forms of discrimination.
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936) (emphasis added). But see Robinson v. Stanley Home Products, Inc.,
272 F.2d 601, 604 (1st Cir. 1959); FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39, 44
(9th Cir. 1959); Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607, 609 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 774 (1945). See generally Rill, note 26 supra, at 338-41. Given the Broch emphasis
upon discrimination, it may now be essential to the invocation of section 2(c) to demonstrate
that the seller sells to customers other than those to whom illegal brokerage has been allowed
and to show the prices charged. See Comment, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 519.
29The salient questions before the Court were whether an independent seller's broker was
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that circumstances might exist in which a conjunctive reduction of
brokerage and price would not be violative of the brokerage clause."
Further, the Court implied that had the buyer rendered services to the
seller or had there been anything in the seller's method of dealing with
the buyer that justified the grant of a discriminatory price, these facts
may have constituted "circumstances" sufficient to relieve the seller of
liability." Thus, by recognizing unjustified discrimination as the basis
of a brokerage clause violation,32 the Court implicitly challenged the
previous "absolute" interpretation of section 2(c). However, in
neglecting to identify the manner in which a seller could avoid
illegality, the Court failed to delineate the precise nature of the
section's proscriptions.33
included as "any person" under § 2(c) and whether the Broch transaction was the type covered
under this section.The entire Court agreed that a seller's broker was covered by the section. 363
U.S. at 170, 179. However, the dissenters posited that this transaction between the seller and his
broker was not within the purview of § 2(c), arguing that the reduction of brokerage merely
represented a renegotiation of rate charged the seller and not paying of "anything of value as a
commission, brokerage, or other compensation," or an "allowance or discount in lieu thereof"
to the buyer, who was the target of the section. Id. at 179-84. Further, the dissent contended that
a decision proscribing the renegotiation of the brokerage payments between a seller and his
independent broker would freeze brokerage rates by establishing the first negotiated rate as an
irrevocable floor. Id. Finally, the dissenters, noting the Court's limitation of the holding to
discriminatory situations, see note 28 supra and accompanying text, contended that the majority
had either tacitly tested the case under § 2(a) standards, the section the minority considered
applicable, and found no cost justification or had "weakened. . . thepersethrust" by reading a
discriminatory element into § 2(c). Id. at 188-89. However, the majority ruled that this seller's
broker's reduction fell within the 2(c) proscriptions since such a reduction was necessary for the
subsequent price reduction to the buyer from the broker. Id. at 175. Thus, Broch became the first
decision to bring the seller's broker under § 2(c). See Comment, 10 DEPAUL L. REV. at 81;
Comment, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 512.
30"This is not to say that every reduction in price, coupled with a reduction in brokerage,
automatically compels the conclusion that an allowance 'in lieu' of brokerage has been granted.
As the Commission itself has made clear, whether such a reduction is tantamount to a
discriminatory payment of brokerage depends on the circumstances of each case." 363 U.S. at
175-76 (1960). See note 28 supra.
" The Court concluded that "there is no evidence that the buyer rendered any services to the
seller or to the respondent nor that anything in its method of dealing justified its getting a
discriminatory price by means of a reduced brokerage charge. We would have quite a different
case if there were such evidence and we need to explore the applicability of § 2(c) to such
circumstances." 363 U.S. at 173. This implied qualification upon the proscription of the
brokerage clause, inferring possible justifications for discrimination, has become the basis for
subsequent decisions allowing "services rendered" and "cost-savings" defenses. See Rill, note 26
supra, at 346-54. See notes 34-68 infra and accompanying text.
3 See note 28 supra.
Prior to the decision in Broch, it had been asserted that "the brokerage clause was the only
section as to which no important question of interpretation still remains unsettled." AUSTIN, at
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Although it has been contended that the construction is strained, 4
there are indications that a significant effect of the Broch dicta has
been a revitalization of the "services rendered" exception. Apparently
accepting "services rendered" as a criterion for determining whether a
discriminatory payment or discount in lieu of payment is justified, 3
the FTC has condoned discounts in several cases where the seller has
established that the compensation had been earned through the
buyer's performance of storage, warehousing and distribution services
with regard to the seller's product. 6 However, the Commission has
attempted to avoid a direct confrontation with the traditional
precedents forbidding buyer-seller payments" by the development of
some contextually unique rationales. Thus, in Flotill Products,Inc."
106. Conversely, since Broch, little consensus exists as to the nature of section 2(c)'s
prohibitions. See RoWE at 330.
See Bison, note 20 supra, at 330.
"In Garrett-Holmes & Co., [196J-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. T 17,209 at
22,279 (FTC 1965), the FTC affirmed a cease and desist order entered against a food broker
who had accepted brokerage or discounts in lieu of brokerage from suppliers with regard to
purchases for the broker's own account for resale. Following the Broch dicta, the Commission
reasoned that "[t]here is no evidence that the buyer rendered any services to the seller(s)
nor that anything in its method of dealing justified its getting a 'discriminatory price' as
'brokerage' or discounts in lieu thereof. [Thus,] [t]he examiner was correct in concluding that
the payments received by the respondent violated section 2(c) of the Clayton Act, as amended." Id. at 22,280. Moreover, the Commission has disallowed a cease and desist order
against a buyer that had been given discriminatory price reductions "in lieu of brokerage" because the discount was for distributive services. Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1437 (1962).
In Hruby, the Commission emphasized the respondent's need to be compensated in order to
compete with independent brokers, id. at 1448, indicating, perhaps, a receptiveness to a
"meeting competition" defense under 2(c). Finally, in Flotill Prods., Inc., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. T 16,970 at 22,032 (FTC 1964), a cease and desist order
against a canned goods supplier who had granted discriminatory prices to certain buyer-brokers was reversed. In a separate opinion, Commissioner Elman noted that "the common
characteristic of all transactions prohibited by 2(c) is that brokerage or other legitimate and
valuable services in distribution are not performed." Id. at 22,046. Thus, only "[s]purious,
false, unearned brokerage is forbidden; but if a businessman performs a valuable and substantial service or function in the distribution of goods, he is entitled to be compensated for it, and
section 2(c) does not apply . . . .That is so even if he is not a conventional broker yet performs services which in other situations are performed by brokers." Id. Commissioner Elman
further emphasized both the necessity of compensation for these services and that the presence and use of this method of distribution was essential to the survival of the small businesses in the canning industry. Id. at 22,047. See generally Rill, note 26 supra, at 341-54;
Comment, 42 N.C.L. REv. 457 (1964).
"Flotill Prods., Inc., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1 16,970 at 22,032
(FTC 1964); Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1437, 1443 (1962). See note 35 supra.
',
See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
"[1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,970 at 22,032 (FTC 1964).
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the Commission found that brokerage had not been realized since
"actual title" did not pass to the broker39 and in Hruby Distributing
Co. 40 held that the apparent brokerage was a "functional discount,"
not cognizable under section 2(c).4' Nevertheless, the implication of
the FTC decisions is that where possible the Commission will remove
alleged brokerage from the purview of section 2(c) on the ground that
the discounts granted were neither "dummy brokerage," since
valuable services in distribution were rendered, nor savings attained
through the seller's reduction of ordinary brokerage services. 2
9

The Commission attempted to avoid the absolute ban upon brokerage payments to buyers
by deciding that "actual" title had not passed to the brokers, although "technical" title may
have been transferred. The Commission reasoned that the recipient of "actual title" determined
the identity of the "other party" to a gales transaction for whom it was illegal to receive
brokerage. Id. at 22,036. Although the brokers in the case were billed and paid for the goods,
admitted to ownership, and exercised substantial control over the articles in distribution, they
were held not to have "actual ownership" because they never gained possession. Id. Thus, the
Commission stated that "[v]iewed as a part of the entire transaction from the time of the placing
of the order by the ultimate purchaser until the delivery of the goods to him, we find that
technical title passage, if such be the case, would not be conclusive but would be merely
incidental to the services performed by the field broker for the canner." Id. at 22,037.
This confusing rationale was criticized, however, in Commissioner Elman's separate opinion:
"The chairman's opinion reaches the right result . . . by a curious route. . . [for] to make
legality depend upon whether his title is 'incidental' or 'absolute' is to introduce irrelevant and
confusing standards into a law designed to deal with the realities of commercial transactions, not
their superficial forms." The Commissioner then proposed his alternative rationale, advising
that "the Commission no longer accepts the dogma that section 2(c) forbids, in any and all
circumstances, the payment of compensation in the form of brokerage for services rendered by a
seller to a purchaser or by a purchaser to a seller" and that this case was one in which section
2(c) did not apply. Id. at 22,048. See Elman, note 18 supra, at 23-25.
4061 F.T.C. 1437 (1962).
4'The Commission held that the practice of the buyer-broker in receiving brokerage was not
within the purview of 2(c), but was a functional discount to be considered under section 2(a). Id.
The Commission reasoned that the buyer operated at a functional level between the producer of
goods and the wholesaler to whom he sold. Since the respondent was at a higher functional level
than a wholesaler, his lower price was considered a functional discount and not a result of
savings in brokerage. Id. at 1448. See generally RowE at 341-42.
The dissent of Commissioner Maclntyre points out that this argument previously had been
made and rejected in Southgate Brokerage Company v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945), and
that that decision is still applicable to buyers purchasing for their own account. Id. at 1455. The
dissent also noted that the Commission's ruling might be interpreted as fusing section 2(a) and
section 2(c) by allowing a price discrimination between non-competitive functional levels that
previously had been allowed only in section 2(a) cases. Id. at 1455. But see notes 138-67 infra
and accompanying text. See Comment, 42 N.C.L. Ray. 457, 466-67 (1964), and notes 54-66
infraand accompanying text, for an analysis of this fusion as a logical development of the BrochThomasville Chairdecisions. See also Rill, note 26 supra, at 346-54.
42 "Hruby is clearly not a 'dummy' broker controlled by a large buyer to whom he passes on
phony brokerage payments. Equally clearly, he is not himself a powerful wholesaler or retail
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Consequently, the legitimacy of these discounts would be
challengeable only under the section 2(a) ban upon direct price

discrimination. 43 Since the defendant would have the advantage of the
statutory defenses there available, the FTC has thus at least partially
debilitated the absolute prohibition of seller-buyer brokerage
4
payments. 1
The procedure of mitigating the proscription of the brokerage
clause by restricting the scope of its application has also received

judicial endorsement. Condoning a seller-buyer discount,45 the Court
chain exacting from his suppliers false brokerage payments, to the competitive disadvantage of
his smaller competitors. And, finally, it is clear that the discounts received by Hruby are not
granted because on sales to him sellers could dispense with brokerage services regularly required
on their sales, thus effecting savings of usual brokerage fees." Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C.
1437, 1447-48 (1962). In Flotill Prods. Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
16,970, at 22,032 (FTC 1964), Commissioner Elman stated that section 2(c) did not proscribe
"legitimate, bona fide transactions . . . but strictly . . . phony, unearned brokerage." Id. at
22,046.
41See notes 38-41 supra.
"Recent decisions have not contributed to a clarification of the FTC's position concerning
the "services rendered" defense. In recent cases involving an independent broker's secret rebates
to buyers of part of its brokerage receipts from sellers, e.g., Connell Rice & Sugar Co., 3 TRADE
REG. REP.
17,948 (May 8, 1967), in cases where brokers have passed along receipts through
financing the buyer's promotional programs, e.g., Alliance Associates, Inc., 3 TRADE REG.REP.
18,309 (May 20, 1968); Modern Mktg. Servs., Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
17,945 (April 17,
1967), and in the classical situation 6f a seller's payments of brokerage to a buyer's broker, e.g.,
A. Greenhouse, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
17,940 (April 27, 1967) (consent order), no attempts
were made to advocate the "services rendered defense."
41 Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v. American Viscose Corp., 364 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1966), cert,
denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967). In the original litigation, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York awarded a summary judgment to a respondent charged with giving
discounts "in lieu of" brokerage. A manufacturer had sold at discount to the respondents, two
rayon processors, who acted as jobbers for the manufacturer. The respondents argued that this
discount was justified because the manufacturer's costs were lower in selling through these
jobbers than they would have been if sales were made directly to small buyers. Accepting the
respondent's position, the court ruled that the "services rendered" defense was available to the
respondents even though the jobbers who performed the service were buyers. Empire Rayon
Yarn Co. v. American Viscose Corp., 238 F. Supp. 556, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the summary judgment for the respondent,
assuming the traditional position that the character of the respondents as buyers made them
incapable of rendering services to the seller because of a conflict in interest. Empire Rayon Yarn
Co. v. American Viscose Corp., 354 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1965) (2-1 decision); see 34 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 808 (1966). In the well-reasoned dissent to this decision, Judge Moore argued that the
majority had erred in banning discounts given to buyers as compensation for services rendered
since such a proscription would expand the brokerage section beyond its intended scope. 354
F.2d at 188-89. Judge Moore emphasized that the services rendered by the buyer were necessary in order to enable the seller to reach markets in which he would otherwise have been unable to compete. Id. at 190, 191. Upon rehearing en banc, the Second Circuit, accepting the
rationale of Judge Moore's dissenting opinion, reversed its decision by ruling that the respon-

Vol. 1968: 937]

ROBINSON-PATMAN DEFENSES

of Appeals for the Second Circuit reasoned, as has the Commission,

that it would be an improper expansion of section 2(c)'s "language
and manifest purpose"" to encompass within its prohibition
anything but "dummy brokerage" or discounts arising because fewer
brokerage services were needed for sales to the recipient buyer.4 7 Thus,
noting that the buyer had provided inventory maintenance,
advertising," and a selling organization, the court found the discount
justifiable as compensation for "services rendered" and therefore
outside the purview of section 2(c)." Although these decisions indicate
the developing legality of service-related discounts, it is likely that
both the courts and the Commission will require that there be a
reasonable relationship between the amount of brokerage or discount
and the nature of the services to the seller since brokerage payments
disproportionate to the value of the services would be partially
unearned and consequently violative of section 2(c). 0 Arguably, a
practical method of determining reasonableness of compensation
would be through comparison between the brokerage granted to the
seller and that demanded by an independent broker for like services.
Although clearly inconsistent with traditional doctrine, the
decisions sustaining seller-buyer brokerages for services rendered find
substantial support both in the text of section 2(c) and in its legislative
history. The congressional report on the Robinson-Patman
amendments5 ' and the comments of those who drafted the legislation5 2
dents' activities did not violate section 2(c). The court stressed that since the buyer performed
a necessary economic function for the seller, the compensatory discount should not be proscribed under § 2(c). Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v. American Viscose Corp., 364 F.2d 491 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
6 354 F.2d at 191. But see notes 5-6 &28 supra and accompanying text.
4'Id. See notes 60-72 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of savings in brokerage as
a basis for justifying a discriminatory payment of discount.
" The jobber-brokers performed services in the "maintenance of substantial inventories of
yarn in their plants as well as in warehouses, maintenance of an experienced selling organization,
... advertising [seller's] products . . . and furnishing technical assistance to users of
[product]." 354 F.2d at 183-84.
1 364 F.2d at 492. As in Hruby, see notes 40-42 supra, the court attempted to superficially
distinguish a "functional discount." Id. However, the approval of the discount given the buyer's
brokers seems to have been based upon the performance of distributive services for the seller. See
J. Moore's dissenting opinion, 354 F.2d at 191, discussed in note 45 supra.
10As indicated in Flotill Prods. Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,970,
at 22,032 (FTC 1964), brokerage payments disproportionate to the value of the services to their
recipient would be an illegal variation of "dummy" brokerage. See note 42 supra.
3 See note 6 supra.
52 See note 6 supra.
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indicate that Congress intended payments of earned brokerage to be
allowed under the brokerage clause, regardless of the relationship of

the parties rendering and receiving the services. Most importantly, the
text of section 2(c) contains no limitation upon the "services
rendered" exception. 3 Moreover, revitalization of the services

rendered provision makes the application of section 2(c) more
consistent with the generally acknowledged purpose of antitrust

legislation: protection of free and, insofar as is practical, unlimited
competition.14 Thus, acceptance of the "services rendered" defense
destroys the monopoly otherwise granted to independent brokers"3

and encourages beneficial competition in the distributive channels 6 by
permitting any party to perform and be compensated for brokerage

services." Finally, it is arguable that allowing seller-buyer brokerage
payments will not eviscerate the efficacy of the brokerage clause's
"

See note 4 supra.

"See AT'r'Y GEN. REP. at 190-93; Elman, note 18 supra, at 23-25. In oral arguments to

Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231,249 (1951), Mr. Justice Jackson, quoted in Oppenheim,
note 21 supra, at 1199 n. 158, commented upon the soft competition rationale of the RobinsonPatman Act: "IT]he whole philosophy of the Sherman Act is go out and compete, get business,
fight for it. Now, the whole philosophy we are asked to enforce here is that you really must not,
you let this business go and not meet the competition. I have difficulty knowing where we are
with this .... Oppenheim has criticized this "soft competition" as "a crutch to the inefficient
in the economy," id. at 1201, and suggests a revision of the present Act. See note 84 infra.
See notes 24-25 supraand accompanying text.
A desirable effect of increased competition in brokerage distribution may be decreased
consumer prices through enhanced distribution efficiency. As stated by Rowe, the result of an
absolute prohibition upon buyer-seller brokerage was "that Section 2(c) [became] a
featherbedding guarantee for the organized food brokers aboard a legal gravytrain-at the
expense of cost-cutting forms of distribution." ROWE at 540. See, e.g., ATr'Y GEN. REP. at
190-91; MQSSEL,COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 55 (1962); NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF
THE U.S.A. 169 (1960).

11A consistent rationale for the decisions that have thus far accepted services rendered as a
justification for brokerage payments between buyers and sellers has been the economic necessity
and/or value of the services performed by the buyer-brokers. Thus, in Flotill Prods., Inc., [19631965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
16,970, at 22,047-48 (FTC 1964), it was emphasized
that the use of buyer-brokers was essential in order for small sellers to survive and effectively
compete with larger sellers. Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1437, 1446 (1962), assumes that a

buyer may compete with independent brokers and, therefore, requires that he must receive
compensation. Moreover, Judge Moore's dissenting opinion in Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v.
American Viscose, 354 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1965), subsequently adopted as a basis for reversal by
the Second Circuit in Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v. American Viscose, 364 F.2d 491 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967), see note 45 supra, noted that the seller could not have
reached the ultimate buyers of a particular sector of the market had the intermittant buyerbroker not been used. 354 F.2d at 190. These decisions clearly recognize that market
participants other than professional brokers can adequately perform brokerage services and, in
certain situations, must perform those services in order to achieve effective competition.
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preclusion of unjustified price discrimination, as feared by courts
initially construing the provision.5 8 As indicated by the recent
decisions, "fraud and oppression"5 9 may be effectively avoided by
careful scrutiny of the evidence to ascertain whether valuable
brokerage services were actually performed and if the brokerage
payments were no more than a reasonable compensation for such
services.
In further mitigation of the section's dissolute proscription,
several courts have gone beyond mere restoration of the "services
rendered" defense by accepting cost-savings as a justification for
discriminatory brokerage payments or discounts, thus debilitating the
doctrinal precept that price differentials effecting reduced brokerage
fees constitute allowances "in lieu of brokerage" violative of section
2(c). Relying upon the "discrimination" emphasis of the Broch
dicta,6" the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that an
alleged violator may avoid section 2(c) liability by demonstrating that
a discount merely reflected bona fide differences in cost of sales to the
recipient buyer resulting from differing methods or quantities in
which commodities are sold or delivered. 6' Thus, despite the FTC's
rejection of the position, - the Fifth Circuit would apparently allow
the defendant to establish the same type of cost justification,
through the same empirical studies, as is required to avoid section
2(a). 63 Although the Fifth Circuit directly addressed price differentials
"See notes 16 & 21 supra.
'9 Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667, 674 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
62560(1940).
See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text.
61Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962). In Thomasville Chair, a

manufacturer of furniture allegedly violated § 2(c) by giving a discount to customers who
purchased a certain amount of goods and by giving his salesmen a lower commission upon sales
to these customers. The Commission had ruled that this reduction of price coupled with a
reduction of commission was a violation of section 2(c).
However, the Fifth Circuit held that if the respondent could introduce evidence showing a
difference in the cost of dealing with the different customer groups, section 2(c) could be avoided.
The basis of this decision was a liberal interpretation of the Broch dicta: "[A]s we read it, the
[Broch] opinion says that a reduction in price, giving effect to reduced commissions paid by the
seller, are violations of Section 2(c) only if such reduction in price is 'discriminatory.' We read
that to mean 'without justification based on actual bona fide differences in the cost of sales
resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are sold or
delivered.'" Id. at 545. See generally Comment, 42 N.C.L. REV. 457 (1964); 51 CALIF. L. REV.
215 (1963); 43 B.U.L. REV. 427 (1963); 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 137 (1961); 13 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 147 (1961).
"See BNA ATrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. A-I1 (No. 120, Oct. 29, 1963).
63According to Thomasville Chair, it is necessary that "the Commission . . .permit a full
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ensuing from savings reflecting partial reductions in brokerage fees,
the rationale would arguably extend to savings resulting from total
non-payment of commissions on sales where such services are
unnecessary. 4 Further, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
has accepted a cost-savings defense to the brokerage clause dissimilar
to section 2(a)'s defense both in the type of cost-savings allowed and
scale inquiry into the propriety of the [discounts] based upon the [cost] differentials permitted
under Section 2(a).
...
306 F.2d at 545. See generally RowE, at 287-90. To successively
achieve cost-justification in § 2(a) litigation, the respondent is generally required to produce an
independent cost study precisely establishing the actual savings redounding to the grantor of the
price reduction. See, e.g., Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 68 (1953); Curtiss
Candy Co., 44 F.T.C. 237, 267 (1947). Further, the studies are required to be conducted with
reference to only the parties involved and the cost-savings of the individual transaction are
required to be shown. Cf. Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945). However, this individual
transaction basis has been recognized as impractical and there is authority for allowance of
group and average studies if they are made by an independent group and follow accepted accounting principles. See United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962); American Motors
Corp. v. FTC, 384 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1967); FTC v. Standard Motor Prods., Inc., 371 F.2d
613 (2d Cir. 1967); American Can Co. v. Russelville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 59-60 (5th
Cir. 1951); Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948), rev'd on other
grounds, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 206 (1952). Nevertheless, the
cost and difficulty of compiling the studies-Minneapolis Honeywell's cost study occupied
four to eight accountants for nine months-have led commentators to consider the defense
as illusory except for the most prosperous. See A-r'Y GEN. REP. 173-74; Adelman, The
Consistency of the Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAN. L. REV. 3, 9 (1953). See generally ROWE
at ch. 10; Blackford,supra note 10, at 299-300; Mayer, supra note 10, at 314-16.
"Both the Commission and Courts early took the position that the reduction or elimination
of brokerage cost to a seller does not justify a brokerage payment or "discount in lieu thereof" to
the buyer. See, e.g., Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945); Great Atd. &
Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940); Union
Mallenisle Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 408 (1955); Custom House Packing Corp., 43 F.T.C. 164
(1946); W.E. Robinson & Co., 32 F.T.C. 370 (1941); Ramsdell Packing Co., 32 F.T.C. 1187
(1941). However, as noted by the dissenters in FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 182-87
(1960), there are indications within the legislative history of the Act that such brokerage savings
were to be allowed to cost justify lower prices, for a provision that would have specifically denied
such reductions or eliminations in brokerage cost as cost justifications under section 2(b), S.
REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1936), was deleted from the bill. H.R. CONF. REP. No.
2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936). Further, the allowance of such savings as cost justifications
under section 2(b), the section applied under the Thomasville case, see note 63 supra and
accompanying text, was condoned upon the Senate floor. 80 CONG. REc. 6285 (1936). However,
although several circuits have indicated their receptiveness to this position, see Thomasville
Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962); Robinson v. Stanley Homes Products, Inc., 272
F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959); cf. Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410, 414
(7th Cir. 1963), and the leading commentator in the area has cogently argued that the acceptance
of reduced or eliminated brokerage costs would eliminate featherbedding by independent
brokers, Rows at 290, the Commission, see Advisory Opinion Digest No. 243, 3 TRADE REG,
REP.
18,334 (May 7, 1968), and most circuits, see FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 282
F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1960), continue to consider payments or "discounts in lieu thereof" caused by
reduced brokerage costs as violative of section 2(c).
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the method of establishing those savings. 65 Recognizing cost-savings
based upon factors such as the buyer's advance commitments and low
credit risk reducing the speculative element of sale,66 the court
did not require that actual cost-savings be precisely shown through
independent cost studies as is axiomatically required in section 2(a)
litigation.67 Rather, the mere identification of certain characteristics
of the transaction, which presumably gave rise to an unascertained
amount of savings to the seller was required by this court. 63
The dissenters in Broch had early foreseen that the Court's dicta
might be interpreted as fusing the direct price discrimination
provisions of section 2(a) with the brokerage clause by indicating that
defenses to the former section, such as cost-justification, would be
effective in avoiding section 2(c). 69 Although failing to accomplish
precisely such a fusion, it seems clear that the interpretations of the
Broch dicta promulgated by the Second and Seventh Circuits
ultimately contradict the legislative intent that no defense other than
"services rendered" be available to those charged under section 2(c).70
Moreover, the effect of so extending the substance of the cost-savings
defense may be to frustrate the Robinson-Patman Act policy of
65In Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963), the court
reversed a cease and desist order entered against a cooperative buying association, totally owned
by small retail grocers, restraining it from accepting discounts and services payments upon its
purchases. The cooperative involved bought from suppliers for its members upon the members'
estimates of their yearly needs, charged the members cost plus for the products thus obtained,
and distributed any "profit" to member stores at the end of the year. Price concessions were
induced from their suppliers by promising that the suppliers would realize savings in their
dealings with Central because of its ". . . advance commitments from its members, the lack of
credit risk, the fact that the suppliers need look to only one central office for payment. . ., and
the fact that Central supplies its own labels." Id. at 413. Ruling that these activities did not
constitute a violation of § 2(c) merely because the amount of discount corresponded to the
amount of brokerage, id. at 414, the court echoed Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541
(2d Cir. 1962), by indicating that the Commission has the burden of showing a causal
connection between the reduced price and reduced or eliminated brokerage expenses. Id. at 415.
"The court found there to be legitimate cost justifications due to the respondent's volume of
business, lack of credit risk, lower billing costs, advance commitments, and supply of a private
label for its products. 319 F.2d at 413. Further, while not attacking precedent, see note 65 supra,
by relying upon this characteristic, the Court noted that no brokerage expenses were incurred
upon Central's privately-branded products. Id. at 414.
67See note 63 supra.
6 See note 66 supra. The obvious danger of this lenient procedure is that it makes impossible

the comparison of actual saving and actual discount. Such a comparison prevents excessive price
reductions based upon small cost savings.
69See note 29 supra.
70See note 6 supra and authority cited therein.
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providing protection for the smaller buyer's market position." Since
the types of cost-savings recognized by these decisions are primarily
those caused by economics of scale-lower unit costs at higher
volumes- 2-the large buyer will be the most common recipient of such
"legitimate" discounts.
However, the competitive disadvantage caused the small buyer by
the extension of a cost-savings defense to section 2(c) seems primarily
illusory since some small buyers may take advantage of the same
economies of scale by organizing into larger cooperative buying
units.73 Also, there is no apparent reason why the extension of this
defense to indirect price discrimination would favor the large buyer
more than the latter is already favored by the judicially sanctioned
application of the cost-savings defense in direct price discrimination
cases. Further, the apparent contradiction of Congressional intent in
accepting a cost-savings defense to section 2(c) charges may be
justified by the ultimate economic effect, the reduction of price to the
consumer resulting from the buyer's ability to "pass along" savings
that would otherwise have been enjoyed by the seller in the form of a
higher profit margin.74 Thus, this extension of the cost-savings defense may ultimately represent the long advocated rejection of the
,The Robinson-Patman Act is not exclusively an antitrust statute aimed only at protecting
competition. Rather, the Act encourages "soft competition," serving dual purposes of
preserving competition and protecting the competitive position of the individual competitor. See
Oppenheim, note 21 supra, at 1198-1202. However, it is contended that, in providing this
statutory protection for individual competitors, the "inefficient and laggard firms" who would
otherwise be driven out by market pressures, are allowed to remain in the economy. See id. at
1201; Blackford, A Survey and Commentary on the Good Faith Meeting of Competition
Defense in theRobinson-PatmanAct, 18 W. REs. L. REV. 753, 775 (1967). Also, this legislative
preference for the "little man" reflects the outdated, Victorian belief that bigness is evil per se
while the "small businessman . . . [has the] virtues that are held in esteem in a capitalistic
society." Id. at 777. See note 84 infra and accompanying text.
"See Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963). See also
FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); Thompson Prods., Inc., 55 F.T.C. 1252 (1959);
Hamburg Bros., 54 F.T.C. 1450 (1958); Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1943).
"See Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc., 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963). However, all
buyers in many industries may not be able to adequately organize since physical distance
between buyers, for example, might effectively negate attempts to form cooperatives. Also, the
time and expense of organizing such organizations might be prohibitive to the smaller buyers.
Finally, the relative efficiency of such cooperatives might be lower than that of the
"professional" broker buyer so as to reduce anticipated cost-savings.
7'See Note, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 215, 219 (1963). See also Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust
Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1139, 1202
(1952). The Seventh Circuit has approved the "worthy effort" of buyers' cooperatives to reduce
the ultimate price to the consumer. See Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d
410,414-15 (7th Cir. 1963).

Vol. 1968: 9371

ROBINSON-PATMAN DEFENSES

statutes' use to protect less efficient small buyers from competitive
market pressures and promote the consumer's interest in an efficient
economy."
To date, neither the Commission nor the courts have gone so far
as to extend a meeting competition, 6 lack of knowledge," or
competitive injury defense78 to section 2(c). Therefore, in order to take
advantage of these defenses, a defendant charged with a RobinsonPatman violation must establish that his activities were 'Without the
scope of section 2(c) and within the purview of section 2(a). The Broch

dissent indicates that this may be accomplished by showing that the
recipient party neither claimed nor received, directly or through an

intermediary, brokerage, allowance, or reduction of price as
compensation Jbr alleged distributive services rendered.9 Although

this argument is as yet untested before either the Commission or the
judiciary, it may safely be predicted that if the term "brokerage" has
been used in describing payments or discounts, a subsequent denial

will be ineffective in avoiding the harsh prohibitions of the brokerage
clause. 0
See ATT'Y GEN. REP. at 192; Oppenheim,.note 74 supra, at 1201.
76See notes 173-90 infra and accompanying text. However, in Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C.
1437 (1962), the Commission emphasized the buyer's need to gain compensation for his services
in order to compete with independent brokers, although this necessity was not discussed in terms
of a "meeting competition" defense. Id. at 1448.
"Although no holding has allowed a buyer or seller to avoid § 2(c) because of a lack of
knowledge of the proscribed activity or an absence of intent to commit the proscribed activity,
there have been indications by the Commission and courts that knowledge may be a relevant
consideration in determining violation of the section. Thus, a seller's violation of 2(c) has been
characterized as allowing payments to brokers with the knowledge that such payments were
being passed along to the buyers. See, e.g., Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 26 F.T.C. 486, 501 (1938),
affid, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940); Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102
F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939); Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687, 689 (2d Cir. 1938);
Exchange Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1, 6 (1962); Haines City Citrus Grocers Ass'n, 58 F.T.C. 815
(1961). Contra, Western Fruit Growers Sales Co. v. FTC, 332 F.2d 67, 68 (9th Cir. 1963);
National Retail-Owned Grocers, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 1208 (1962); Eidson Produce Co., 60 F.T.C. 1,
5-6 (1962). Moreover, Broch, with characteristic ambiguity, indicated that a buyer's intent (or
knowledge) might be material if he is charged with receiving an allowance that violates § 2(c).
363 U.S. at 174. Consequently, it has been argued that no culpability will be attached to a party
unless he has reason to suspect that the activity is violative of § 2(c). ROWE at 347. Contra,
Comment, 28 U. CH. L. REV. at 515. However, there seems to be general agreement that neither
intent nor scienter need be proved to achieve a brokerage-clause violation. See, e.g., Note, 41
NOTRE DAME LAW. 355, 362 (1966).
"See notes 169-72 infra and accompanying text.
'p363 U.S. at 180, 182; cf. Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v. American Viscose Co., 364 F.2d 491
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1437 (1962).
" It would be inconsistent with the purposes of § 2(c), see notes 5-6 supra and accompanying
text, to allow parties who have attempted to conceal actual price discrimination in the guise of

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1968: 937

Since Broch, there is an apparent trend away from an
interpretation of the brokerage clause proscriptions as absolute.
Judicial and enforcement-agency acceptance of effective defenses to
section 2(c) seems to indicate a growing recognition of the economic
necessity for alternative methods of distribution.' However, it would
be misleading to infer that the defendant charged with a brokerage
clause violation may now present these defenses with a certainty that
either the Commission or all courts will be sympathetic to his
arguments. The numerous cases holding that seller-buyer discounts
are invalid per se have not been directly overruled, and there has been
an obvious reluctance upon the part of courts and the FTC to
challenge this "traditional" position. 2 Consequently, unless the
Supreme Court overrules the absolute interpretation83 or Congress
amends the section," the outcome of section 2(c) litigation will be
determined primarily by the willingness of the forum to ignore, or
superficially distinguish, precedent in favor of the compelling
economic rationale of the defenses. Moreover, the few cases accepting
defenses to the brokerage clause have been less than informative as to
brokerage to utilize the more extensive and well-defined deferlses to section 2(a) by admitting
that their "brokerage" was a sham. Arguably, this treatment may result in some unnecessary
harshness in the treatment of an inane businessman who does not realize the consequences of
brokerage terminology, see Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1437, 1449 (1962), but the restriction
nevertheless seems necessary to effect the purpose of the section in discouraging hidden price
discrimination. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 24, 25, 74 supraand accompanying text.
22 See notes 38-41 supra.
83 Broch was the Court's initial decision construing the brokerage clause. Unfortunately, there
has been no significant subsequent litigation and there are no section 2(c) cases presently pending
before the Court.
" It has been suggested that the entire Robinson-Patman Act should be revised to make it
consistent with § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), and §§ 3 and 7
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14 & 18 (1964), to better align the Act with "national antitrust
policy." Oppenheim, note 74 supra, at 1201. Oppenheim suggests that the proscriptions of § 2
should be applied only if the effect of discrimination is to substantially lessen competition or to
create monopoly. Further, the modified statute would favor "hard competition" by sanctioning
discrimination if justified on the basis of cost-savings, good faith meeting of competition, or
"other legitimate economic justifications in the distribution system. . . ... Id. at 1202. Sections
2(c), (d), and (e) would be eliminated as all forms of illegal rebates could be included within the
interpretation of "price." Brokerage payments would be valid if made for actual and bona fide
services rendered, regardless, apparently, of the relationship of the parties. Id. at 1206-07. See
also Ar'Y GEN. REP. More recently, Commissioner Elman has also called for a reappraisal of
the traditional interpretation and application of § 2(c) against buyer-seller brokerage payments.
Elman, The Robinson-PatmanAct and Anti-Trust Policy: A Timefor Reappraisal,42 WAsH.
L. REv. 1, 24-25 (1966).
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the constituent elements necessary to present an effective defense.s
The type of services that are mandatory for the "services rendered"
defense have not been succinctly described, nor have the criteria to be
used in determining whether the compensation for such services is
86
reasonably proportional to their value been adequately delineated.
The elements of a cost-savings defense to the brokerage clause are
equally poorly defined. The two circuits that recognize this defense
disagree upon the basic issues of what cost-savings shall be
acknowledged 7 and the method of proving these savings. 8
Consequently, the scope of the brokerage clause and the nature of
defenses to its imposition remain in a state of flux, unclarified by any
significant litigation during the past few years. Given this absence of
consistent development, the potential defendant to a 2(c) accusation
can have little confidence in the successful utilization of these
defenses.
SECTIONS

2(d) AND 2(e)-PROMOTIONAL

FACILITIES AND ALLOWANCES

The proscriptions of sections 2(d) and 2(e) were enacted, as was
section 2(c),89 to prevent indirect price discrimination90 by precluding
suppliers from granting promotional benefits in connection with sales
to favored customers, while contemporaneously withholding
proportionate concessions from the customers' competitors.' A
prima facie violation of section 2(d) is established if it is shown that a
supplier discriminated by compensating only selected customers for
"See notes 39, 41 &45 supra.
"See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
" See notes 28-31, 61-68 supra and accompanying text.
"See notes 28-31, 61-68 supra and accompanying text.
"See note 5supra.

See notes 7& 8 supra.
"Although "sections 2(d) and 2(e)'s literal text is susceptible to extension beyond the area of
promotional arrangements related to the customer's resale of the supplier's product, decisions of
the Federal Trade Commission and courts have repudiated such strained applications and

confined these provisions to their legislatively contemplated promise." ROWE at 380. See, e.g.,
Skinner v. United States Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1956) (discriminatory credit
arrangement held not actionable under section 2(e) ); American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning
Co., 191 F.2d 38, 56 (8th Cir. 1951) (freight and delivery arrangements ruled price
discriminations and not violative, as furnishings, of section 2(e) ).
Where a discriminatory promotional allowance exists, however, the question remains whether
the FTC has a choice to bring the action under either the price discrimination provisions of

section 2(a) or section 2(d). If payments are not given for, or in contemplation of, promotional
services, the Commission considers them to be without the scope of § 2(d) and subject to
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customer-performed promotion. 92 Section 2(e) is violated if the
supplier similarly discriminates in performing promotional services
for selected buyers. 93 Although variations in the wording of the texts
of sections 2(d) and 2(e) have been the source of substantial confusion
as to their interrelationship,94 the sections are now generally
recognized as complimentary 9 and, thus, avoidable by the same
defenses.96
While the qualifying language of section 2(c) has been subject to
conflicting interpretations, it is clear that sections 2(d) and 2(e) do not
promulgate absolute proscriptions. Rather, the text of both sections
indicates that their effect may be negated if the respondent-supplier
shows that there was no discrimination between competing customers
consideration only under § 2(a). See Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co., 59 F.T.C. 693 (1960);

Rowe at 386. However, this subjective standard, requiring consideration of the intent of the
supplier at the time the allowance is made, seems impractical since it necessitates a difficult and
probably inaccurate inquiry into the "mental processes" of an individual or a corporation. See
Note, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 382, 386 (1966).
2 The enforcement agency must show merely that one customer received promotional aid
while it was contemporaneously withheld from others in order to shift the burden of justifying
the discrimination to the respondent. R.H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964);
Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480,486 (2d Cir. 1962). The Commission is not
required to show, as in section 2(a) litigation, that such a "discrimination" had any injurious
effect upon competition. FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65 (1959). See generally
Note, 68 YALE L.J. 808 (1959); 28 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 671 (1960); 42 MARQ. L. REV. 262
(1958).
11See note 92 supra.
4
9 See Fisher, Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-PatmanA ct: Babel Revisited, II VAND.
L. REv. 453, 467 (1958). However, the differing terms of sections 2(d) and 2(e), "customer" and
"available" in the former as compared to "purchaser" and "accorded" in the latter, are
considered interchangeable. Also, the phrases "competing in the distribution of such products
and commodities" and "engaged in commerce," of 2(d) are read into section 2(e). See id. at 47681; Comment, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. at 165. Ultimately, "[m]inor discrepancies in these twin
provisions were ironed out by courts ready to resolve the two subsections into a harmonious
whole." A -r'y GEN. REP. 189. See, e.g., FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 62 (1959);
American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1962); Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v.
Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 992-93 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945); K.S. Corp. v.
Chemstrand Corp., 198 F. Supp. 310, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
,
11"It seems clear. . . that sections 2(d) and 2(e) are companion sections and that distinctions
between them should not be drawn merely because of the differences in terminology employed in
each section. These sections are companion sections to the extent that they have the same
purpose and seek to eliminate the same evil.
...
State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co., 154 F. Supp. 471,474 (N.D. I11.
1957), modifiedon othergrounds, 258 F.2d 831
(7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 947 (1959); see Note, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 382, 383
(1966); Comment, 29 U. CHt. L. REV.at 165.
See notes 94-95 supra. See generally Kintner, Merchandising Allowances and Services:
Sections 2(d) and2(e) oftheRobinson-PatmanAct, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 364, 365-67 (1966).
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because promotional benefits were "available 97 to all on "proportionally equal terns."9 In order to establish "availability," a respondent-supplier usually must demonstrate that promotional aids were
actually offered to all compeiing customers.99 Thus, a prudent

supplier uses a method of offering promotional aid which provides a
verifiable record, such as written copies of offers mailed. 00 Further, a
supplier's demonstration that his promotional plan provided for a
universal offer apparently fails to demonstrate sufficient

"availability" if such offers are not, in fact, made in accordance with

the plan. Thus, the initial supplier is required to police the
administration of the promotional scheme in order to ensure that the
proper distribution of benefits is fully implemented.' 0
Concomitantly, to establish "proportional equality," an alleged
"See notes 8 & 9 supra. Seegenerally ROWE at 399-414; Kintner, note 96 supra, at 365-67.
See notes 8 & 9 supra. Although sections 2(d) and 2(e) were enacted to curtail the
bargaining power of powerful buyers, see notes 7 & 8 supra, the sections are directed at
controlling the conduct of the supplier by forbidding him to yield to any unfair demands by
powerful buyers. Section 2() is directed toward the purchaser:"[l]t shall be unlawful for any
person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a
discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section." Robinson-Patman Act § 2, 15
U.S.C. § 13(t) (1964). See generally Frey, The Evidentiary Burden on Affirmative Defenses
UnderSection 2(j) of the Robinson-PatmanAct: Automatic Canteen Revisited, 36 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 347 (1967) (discussion of defenses available to a respondent-buyer under section 2() ).
9The Commission has recognized that secret promotional concessions are not "available."
See, e.g., Celanese Corp. of America, 46 F.T.C. 1170, .1173-74 (1950); N. Erlanger, Blumgart &
Co., 46 F.T.C. 1139, 1142 (1950); National Modes, Inc., 46 F.T.C. 404, 419, 436 (1950). Both
the Commission and the courts require that suppliers offer aid to all purchasers. See, e.g., Vanity
Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962); Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 52 F.T.C.
1535, 1548 (1956); Kay Windsor Frocks, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 89, 94-95 (1954). The Commission has,
thus, advised that "[tihe seller should take some action to inform all his customers who compete
with any participating customer that the promotion is available." Federal Trade Commission
1967 Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other MerchandisingPayments andServices, 16
C.F.R. § 240.6(b) [hereinafter cited as FTC Guides]. Further, the Commission suggests that
"It]he seller and customer should have a clear understanding about the exact terms of the offer
and the conditions upon which payments will be made for services and facilities furnished." Id.
at § 240.6(d).
100
The Commission acknowledges that a supplier may undertake the offer "by any means he
chooses, including letter, telegram, notice on invoices, salesman, brokers, etc." It is
recommended that "if a seller wants to be able to show later that he did make an offer to a
certain customer, he is in a better position to do so if he made it in writing." FTC Guides § 240.8.
A respondent cannot establish "availability" by proving merely "that respondent's sales
representatives had been 'advised' of its policies with respect to special promotional allowances
and 'instructed to inform respondent's customers thereof .... ."
Vanity Fair
Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480, 485 (2d Cir. 1962). Rather, to meet the availability
standard, such a respondent must show that the sales representatives had carried out such instructions. Id.
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violator of section 2(d) or 2(e) must prove that his promotional
subsidies were ultimately allotted on a measurable objective basis. 02
Although acknowledging that no single method is required,0 3 the
FTC seems to prefer plans which apportion aid on the basis of the
customer's purchase volume.' 4 Finally, since promotional offers are
not "available" if specifically tailored for "oI
or within the economic
limitations of 106 only a few selected buyers, a promoter-supplier may
be required to show that his promotional program provided viable
alternative forms of media participation designed to fit his customers'
adverse business and financial needs.'0 7
,02
See, e.g., Chicago Spring Prod. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 254 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. Ill.), affd,
371 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1966); Day's Tailor-D Clothing, Inc., 55 F.T.C. 1584 (1959); Black Mfg.
Co., 54 F.T.C. 1196 (1958); Revlon Prods. Corp., 53 F.T.C. 127 (1956); Elgin Watch Co., 48
F.T.C. 990,997 (1952). See generally RowE, at 404-09.
"0IThe Commission has stated that "[n]o single way to proportionalize is prescribed by law.
Any method that treats competing customers on proportionally equal terms may be used." FTC
Guides § 240.7. Generally, "any properly measurable basis is acceptable if it is not artificially
tailored into proportionally equal terms by fitting it into some imaginery basis or standard that
never, in fact, existed." PATMAN at 135.
' The Commission has stated that proportion can "generally. . .best be done by basing the
payments made or the services furnished on the dollar volume or the quantity of goods
purchased during a specified time." FTC Guides § 240.7. Three programs have been suggested
by which a respondent may conform to the requirements of §§ 2(d) and 2(e): (I) payment of a
dollar allowance per unit of promotional service rendered by each buyer, up to a uniform
maximum percentage of his dollar volume; (2) a simplified plan, granting each buyer a set dollar
allowance per unit of merchandise bought, on condition that he perform a specified minimum
quantum of promotional services; and (3) the seller's direct furnishing of promotional services to
the buyer, worth a uniform percentage of each buyer's volume. ATr'Y GEN. REP. at 189; see
e.g., Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 50 F.T.C. 525 (1953); Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., 50
F.T.C. 513 (1953); Lever Bros. Co., 50 F.T.C. 494 (1953).
"'See, e.g., Shreveport Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1963), cerl.
denied, 375 U.S. 971 (1964) (special allowances to chain stores); Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc.
v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962) (participation in a chain store's anniversary sale); Hartley &
Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1962) (services to one
distributor); Elizabeth Arden, Inc., 39 F.T.C. 288 (944), affd, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947). See Kintner, note 96 supra, at 366.
'16
Simply stated, "[a]n offer to make a service available to one the economic status of whose
business renders him unable to accept the offer, istantamount to no offer at all." State
Wholesale Grocers v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831, 839 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 947 (1959); accord, Shreveport Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 971 (1964) (minimum eligibility of 9000 cases per year); Atlanta Prod.
Corp., No. 8513 (F.T.C., Dec. 13, 1963) (minimum of $1500 worth of purchases in six month
period); Lean & Fink Prod. Corp., No. 8506 (F.T.C., July 27, 1964) (promotion only available if
buyer purchases full line of seller's goods); see RowE at 400; Kintner, note 96, supra, at 366-67.
"07"The plan must allow all types of competing customers to participate . . . .This may
require offering all customers more than one way to participate in the plan. The seller cannot
expressly, or by the way the plan operates, eliminate some competitive customers. Where the
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By demanding that participation in the promotional plan be
economically feasible for all customers, the Commission and the
courts have drastically limited the supplier's discretion both as to
determining which customers will receive aid and as to choosing the
type of promotional media subsidized. These restrictions have been
challenged as unreasonable since they may reduce the effectiveness of
the supplier's entire promotional plan by mandating patronage of
relatively ineffective promotional methods." 8 Additionally, a supplier
might be forced to associate his product with a customer whose public image is unsatisfactory.' 9 Although the possibility of hardship to
the supplier is undeniable, it would seem to be an unavoidable incident in attaining the purposes of sections 2(d) and 2(e), since without
the stringent requirement that participation in promotional offers be
possible for all buyers, a seller would be free to confer substantial
competitive advantage upon favored customers. 110
Despite a supplier's inability to establish that promotional aid was
made "available" to all customers on "proportionally equal" terms,
liability under sections 2(d) and 2(e) may still be avoided by reliance
upon the language of the section which proscribes discrimination in
seller has alternative promotional plans, his customers must be given the opportunity to choose
among the plans.
"Example 1. S offers a plan for cooperative advertising on radio, television or in a newspaper.
Some of his customers who compete with those who receive the allowance are too small to use
the offer. He must offer them some usable and proportional alternative, such as advertising in
a neighborhood paper, handbills, etc .. " FTC Guides § 240.9; see, e.g., Colgate-PalmolivePeet Co., 50 F.T.C. 525 (1953) (different amounts of aid granted for newspaper, radio, handbill
advertisements and indoor displays); Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., 50 F.T.C. 513 (1953)
(same); Lever Bros. Co., 50 F.T.C. 495 (1953) (same).
"'See Oppenheim, note 74 supra, at 1207 n.179. A Commissioner of the Federal Trade
Commission has attacked sections 2(d) and 2(e) as undue restrictions upon the free enterprise
system based upon the economically irrational assumption that all promotional allowances are
disguised price rebates. Elman, note 84 supra, at 26-27. Stressing the significant interference
with supplier choice of promotional recipients and methods, Commissioner Elman contends that
the ultimate question would be "whether so serious an interference with a supplier's discretion
in allocating his advertising resources is justified, in the absence of any inquiry whatsoever as to
effect on competition." Id. at 27. This argument has likely been one of the factors leading to a
perceptible recent ad hoc trend against per se application of the promotional sections. See notes
76-81, 106-09 infra and accompanying text. The argument is actually not a recent development,
however, as Oppenheim early recognized that such interference was not required and suggested
that the Act be rewritten to proscribe only those allowances that lessen competition. See
Oppenheim, note 74 supra, at 1207.
109See Elman, note 84 supra, at 26.
"I Elman admits that "[i]f a [supplier] may budget his cooperative advertising program so as
to select those purchasers with the greatest prestige, the result may be to confer substantial
competitive advantages on large buyers." See Elman, note 84 supra, at 27. Such action is
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promotional assistance only between competing customers."' Thus,
the prohibitions of 2(d) and 2(e) are inapplicable if a respondentsupplier proves that the customers from whom promotional aid was
withheld did not compete in the resale of their purchases with the
subsidized customer because the goods sold to each customer group
were not of "like grade and quality.""' 2 In determining the meaning of
this term for purposes of Robinson-Patman Act litigation, intangible
characteristics which may influence the consumer's demand for the
product, such as brand names, apparently may not be considered in
deciding whether goods purchased by different customers are
sufficiently dissimilar." 3 Rather, relying upon the legislative history of
the Act"4 and noting the Commission's preference for a physical
diametrically opposed to the purpose of §§ 2(d) and 2(e), recently defined by the Supreme
Court as protection of the small buyer. See note 153 infra and accompanying text.

" The text of § 2(d) indicates that only those "customers competing in the distribution" of the
supplier's goods are entitled to proportionally equal treatment. See note 8 supra. This
"competing" requirement is read into § 2(e). See note 94 supra. See generally Rowe 394-99;

Kintner, note 96 supra, at 367-69.
"I The sections 2(d) and 2(e) requirement of competing purchasers, see notes 8 & 9 supra,
has been interpreted to mean purchasers of products and commodities "of like grade and quality," as in section 2(a). See, e.g., Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 369, 372 (2d
Cir. 1958); Matter of Golf Ball Mfgrs. Ass'n, 26 F.T.C. 824, 851 (1938). See generally Comment, Like Grade and Quality: Emergence of the Commercial Standard, 26 OHIO ST. L.J. 294
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 26 OHIO ST. L.J.]; Note, 49 MINN. L. REV. 1176
(1965).
"'See FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966). In Borden, the Supreme Court demonstrated
tlie irrelevance of brand appeal by rejecting the Court of Appeals' ruling, 339 F.2d 133 (2d Cir.
1964), that a manufacturer's private brand and premium brand of milk were not goods of "like
grade and quality," although chemically identical, because of the consumers' preference for the
premium brand. See generally Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91,23640 (1966); 19 VANDERBILT L. RE. 919 (1966).
',
In FTC v. Borden Co., note 113 supra, the Court noted that during the Robinson-Patman
hearings an amendment was proposed to make the legislation applicable only to sales of
commodities of "like grade, quality and brand." 383 U.S. at 641. However, this amendment was
rejected upon the argument that the modification would destroy the efficacy of the bill by
allowing suppliers to discriminate easily by selling different brands to favored customers. Id. at
641-42 nA.Although this objection was reasonable since the proposed amendment would have
allowed a supplier to differentiate products through the use of commercially insignificant
brands, it may be contended that rejection of the proposed "brand" amendment was incorrectly
interpreted by the Court to exclude any consideration of commercially significant brand
differences under the present "like grade and quality" standard. See Comment, 26 OHIO ST. L.J.
at 316-18; notes 121-23 infra and accompanying text.
Moreover, the Court considered as indicative of Congressional intent that brands not be
considered in deciding "like grade and quality," 383 U.S. at 643, the statements by
Representative Patman, sponsor of the legislation, to the effect that brand would not suffice to
differentiate products that are of the same physical quality. 80 CONG. REc. 8115 (1936).
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comparison test," 5 the Supreme Court has required a respondent to
show that goods are not "physically and chemically alike"" 6 before

the Act may be avoided." 7 Consequently, to rebut a prima facie
violation of section 2(d) or 2(e), a respondent supplier must establish that the goods purchased by his customers were not of "like
grade and quality" by showing that they were of diverse design, size,
or composition." 8

This physical comparison standard for "like grade and quality"
may be criticized as unrealistic since it fails to recognize that the final
"'See FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. at 640, citing Whitaker Cable Corp., 51 F.T.C. 958
(1955); Page Dairy Co., 50 F.T.C. 395 (1953); United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998 (1950);
United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1938); Hansen Innoculator Co., 26 F.T.C. 303
(1938); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936).
"' See FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966); note 115 supra. In Borden, the Court failed to
explore the related and salient issue concerning the degree of physical or chemical variation
which is necessary to establish product distinction. Unfortunately, the Commission has been
inconsistent in deciding this question. In several cases, the FTC has indicated that any physical
difference would differentiate products. See, e.g., Atalanta Trading Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565 (1956)
(violation of § 2(d) found by subsidizing specially processed and packaged Canadian bacon but
not ham), rev'd on othergrounds, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958).
However, more recent decisions indicate that only physical differences which affect a
consumer's preference will suffice to distinguish products. See, e.g., Quaker Oats Co., [19631965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
16948, at 22,213 (FTC 1964) (different contents of
oat flour held not to distinguish); General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956) (different coffee
beans of like grade and quality). See generally Note, 49 MINN. L. REv. 1176, 1182-87
(1965). Several courts have also applied this "commercially significant physical difference'
test. See Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958); Central Ice Cream Co.
v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 184 F. Supp. 312 (N.D. I1. 1960), affd, 287 F.2d 265 (7th
Cir. 1961); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949), affd,
187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), modified. 190 F.2d 73 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 875 (1951).
The status of this more sophisticated approach to product differentiation is uncertain, however, in light of the Supreme Court's failure to expound upon the precise constituents of the
physical and chemical similarity test to which it adhered in Borden.
ti The FTC's emphasis upon a physical test in determining "like grade and quality" under § §
2(a), 2(d) and 2(e), relied upon by the Borden majority, has been criticized as inconsistent with
the position assumed by the Commission when the "meeting competition" defense of § 2(b) is
advocated. See note 173 infra. In several cases, the Commission has disallowed the § 2(b)
defense by ruling that an intense public preference for a certain brand which causes the lowering
of that brand's prices to the price level of a less desired, non-premium brand is not "meeting"
but "beating," see note 177 infra and accompanying text, the latter brand's competition. See
Callaway Mills Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
16,800, at 21,755 (FTC
1964), noted in 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1104 (1964); Standard Oil Co., 49 F.T.C. 923, 952 (1953);
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 396 (1948), rev'd on other grounds, 191
F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951). Thus, the Commission apparently applied a standard that does not
recognize consumer brand preference in certain cases while, without explanation, it relies upon
brand difference in § 2(b) litigation. See generally Comment, 26 OHIO ST. L.J. at 308-11.
"I See note 116 supra.
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decision as to what are "like" products is made by the consumer and

that this decision is not made upon the basis of chemical analysis but
upon a general economic comparison of the product." 9 Brand names,
irrelevant under the Supreme Court's test, may significantly influence

ultimate consumer choice by indicating the greater dependability or
quality of a product. 2 ° Arguably, if such intangibles are not

considered, the function of the "like grade and quality" requirement
in limiting application of Robinson-Patman to competitive
transactions may be perverted under the narrow physical comparison

test since it enables suppliers to elude the Act by merely incorporating
slight tangible variations in their products. 2 ' This inherent deficiency

in the physical similarities standard has caused several courts to
advocate a "market test" under which "like grade and quality" is
determined by emphasis upon the cross-elasticity of consumer
demand for the specified products-whether the consumer considered the goods interchangeable at the same price."' Under this stan-

dard, due consideration is accorded to both physical and intangible
characteristics influencing consumer demand for the product in
"'See FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637,648 (1965) (dissent); Comment, 26 OHIO ST. L.J. at
296.
20 It has been argued that "[a]n important
ingredient of the premium brand inheres in the
consumer's belief, measured by past satisfaction and the market reputation established by [a
brand] for its products, that tomorrow's can will contain the same premium product as that
purchased today." FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 651 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In Borden,
the dissenters noted that there was a basis for this attributed quality of the premium product
since the supplier took special precautions with his premium product to see that "flawed"
products did not reach the consumer. Id.
12 Although adoption of the "physical-comparison" test may allow suppliers to avoid the
statute by incorporating slight tangible variations in their products, and thereby distinguishing
them as not of "like grade and quality," FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 657 (1966) (Stewart,
J., dissenting), this danger may be mitigated by the developing requirement in FTC litigation
that goods differ in a significant physical characteristic before they may be distinguished. The
status of this standard is somewhat unclear, however, after Borden. See note 116 supra.
" In Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958), the Second Circuit,
although initially rejecting a "cross-elasticity" standard, indicated approval of a
"substitutability" test under which goods sought by the same consumers for the same purpose
and which were competitive "price-wise" would constitute products of "like grade and quality."
Id. at 371 n.5. See Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964), rev'd,383 U.S. 637 (1966);
cf. Universal-Rundle Corp., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
16,948, at
22,002 (FTC 1964).
Although variously titled, equivalent "market" standards recognizing that consumer demand
for a given product is influenced both by the product's tangible and intangible characteristics
have been long advocated. See ROWE 74-76; Ar'y GEN. REP. at 158; Comment, 26 OHIo ST.
L.J. at 294. Moreover, it has been suggested that the scope of "like grade and quality" be
expanded to any products, regardless of their physical or promotional characteristics, that affect
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"' In any event,
issue. 23
it seems likely that a supplier's attempt to justify
selective promotional assistance on the ground that no discrimination
existed between "competing" customers may be perceptibly
strengthened by differentiating the products sold, both on the basis of
physical differences and under the compelling theoretical rationale of
the "market test" analysis. '
The competitive transaction limitation of sections 2(d) and 2(e)
may also be used to avoid application of sections 2(d) and 2(e) by
proving that there were no "competing" customers at the time of, or

for a reasonable period after, the offer of promotional aid was made
to the subsidized buyer.'25 The purpose of these sections in insuring
that all customers of a supplier be treated fairly and equally has been
considered to require only that the supplier make promotional offers
through price change or promotion one another's competitive position. See Note, 49 MINN. L.
REv. 1176, 1188-96 (1965).
I] Neither the "physical comparison" test nor the "market" test is acceptable in its "pure"
form. If only the physical characteristics are considered, the scope of §§ 2(a), 2(d), and 2(e) may
be too narrow to effectuate the Robinson-Patman Act's primary purpose of ensuring that
customers of diverse size will be accorded fair treatment in similar sales transactions since
relatively superficial physical variation may justify discriminatory assistance. See note 116
supra. Conversely, a pure market standard that determined "like grade and quality" only by
cross-elasticity of demand for products is too broad because this standard would encompass all
products that perform the same general function. See Comment, 26 OHIo ST. L.J. at 322. Thus,
a hybrid standard has been suggested that would first determine "like quality" by considering
the significant physical characteristics of a product. If the products could not be distinguished by
this examination of physical characteristics, the intangible characteristics would be considered
to determine "like grade." Only if both the "like quality" and "like grade" considerations were
satisfied would the sections be applied. Id. at 322-25. This hybrid, however, has yet to be tested
before a court or the Commission.
1, See notes 119-22 supra and accompanying text.
See Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958). In Atalanta, a large food
distributor was charged with a violation of § 2(d) when, after granting promotional allowances
to its only purchaser in a market area, it refused to grant the same allowances to buyers who
moved into the area five months later. Also, the respondent had granted special Christmas
allowances to the same purchaser upon a product that eight months earlier had been sold
unpromoted to other purchasers in the market area. Reversing the Commission's cease and
desist order against the distributor on the ground that the transactions were not reasonably
simultaneous, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that section 2(d) permitted
sales with promotional allowances subsequent to sales without allowances since the converse rule
would stifle competition by not allowing a supplier to meet competition. Id. at 371. See notes
173-90 infra and accompanying text. Similarly, the court held that under § 2(d) a supplier was
not required to continue promotional offers after a "certain period of time," despite acceptance
by less than all suppliers, since "the terms of an initial sale. . . would freeze the supplier into an
immutable position." 258 F.2d at 372. Thus, both the court and the Commission recognize that,
in a § 2(d) or, presumably, § 2(e) violation "the time interval [between sales] is a determining
factor." Id.; see Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964); Kay Windsor
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26 This temporal
available for reasonably simultaneous transactions.'

limitation upon the proscriptions of sections 2(d) and 2(e) seems to
evidence a tacit recognition that promotional campaigns fail to effect
permanently consumer preference among the supplier's vendees since
promotional messages are commonly either disregarded or soon
forgotten. 27 Moreover, if these sections were not so limited, suppliers
would be deterred from making any offers of promotional assistance
by the immense financial burden of being permanently bound to such

offers.' 28 Unfortunately, the decisions have not been instructive as to
the criteria considered in determining when transactions are
"reasonably simultaneous."

29

Nevertheless, it may be suggested that
the market characteristics of the goods purchased by the supplier's
customers, 30 including whether they support a seasonal market or are

annually obsolete, and the nature of the promotional aid both as to
Frocks, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 89 (1954); cf. Valley Plymouth v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 219 F.
Supp. 608 (S.D. Cal. 1963), noted in 5 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 479 (1964). See generally
ROWE 48-51, 391-92; Ai'r'Y GEN. REP. at 178.
126"[I]he supplier's obligations to ensure 'proportional equality' extend only to those who buy
his promoted products at approximately the same time." ROWE at 391.
127It may be argued that the failure to find a § 2(d) violation in Atalanta Trading Corp. v.
FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958), note 125 supra, was based upon the conclusion that
competitive injury was impossible since the passage of time had negated the effect of any
discrimination between customers. In Atalanta, the court avoided a direct confrontation with
the rule that proof of competitive injury is not required for a § 2(d) or § 2(e) violation
promulgated in Simplicity Trading Co. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1958), modified, 360
U.S. 55 (1959), by reasoning that there was no discrimination among purchasers by Atalanta
since none of the non-subsidized purchasers bought their goods within a reasonable time of the
subsidized transaction. See Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 372 (2d Cir. 1958).
The court concluded that "[a]ssuming the validity of dispensing with proof of actual competitive
injury, to hold that Section 2(d) has been violated in the face of a record revealing that the
promotional allowances could not possibly have hadany discriminatoryeffects would establish
an inflexible rule at odds with the basic concept of free competition. The two trivial sales isolated
in time by at least five months from the substantial sales on which the allowances were given
do not violate either the letter or the spirit of Section 2(d)." Id. (emphasis added).
12, Cf Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 372 (2d Cir. 1958); note 125 supra.
The courts have merely stated certain time periods as demarcating the limits of reasonable
simultaneity without indicating the basis upon which the particular duration utilized was
selected. See Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 709 (9th Cir. 1964) (one year);
Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 1958) (eight months).
110In Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958), see note 125 supra, a
significant factor in determining simultaneity apparently seems to have been the perishable
nature of the pork products being promoted. See 258 F.2d at 372. Also, the systematic
introduction of a new product resulting in the obsolescence of the old model, as in the
automobile industry, may limit the time of reasonably simultaneous transactions to, at most, the
period of the current model. See Valley Plymouth v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 219 F. Supp.
608 (S.D. Cal. 1963); ROWE 50.
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the amount and the type of promotion subsidized,' 3 ' will be studied in
deciding whether separate sales transactions were within the temporal

purview of section 2(d) or 2(e).
Although not yet singularly advocated as a defense to section 2(d)

or 2(e), a third approach apparently available to a supplier is to
establish that his customers are not "competing" for the same group
of customers. 3 1 If the fundamental requirement is to demonstrate a

practical impossibility of competitive disadvantage resulting from
discriminatory promotional assistance among buyers from a common

vendor, it seems arguable that a supplier may permissibly differentiate
in promotional service to customers that are so geographically distant
from each other that they are not viable alternative sources of
purchase for the same vendees.' 33 Thus, a respondent might endeavor

to establish that his customers are not actually entitled to equal
promotional treatment by presenting evidence concerning the
mileage,'34 natural boundaries 35 and/or artificial boundaries'36 that
" The seasonal nature of the promotion subsidized, Christmas wrappings and recipes and
picnics for July Fourth, seems clearly to have affected the court's determination regarding the
period between reasonably simultaneous transactions in Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258
F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 1958). Similarly, the small amount of aid rendered compared to the
amount of purchases made by the recipient was especially significant to the court. Id. at 367.
"I "The seller is required to provide in his plan only for those customers who compete in the
distribution of the promoted product with the customer who is participating in the promotion.
Therefore, the seller can limit the area of his promotion to that in which participating customers
sell.
"Example 2. Manufacturer A distributes his products nationally. He may lawfully engage in a
special promotional campaign in the New England states without making the same program
available to customers in the remainder of the country who do not compete with New England
customers." FTC Guides § 240.12. See also Kintner, note 96 supra, at 365-66. Although no §
2(d) or 2(e) litigation has been dismissed on this ground, both the Commission and the courts
have indicated the necessity for competition within the geographic area by analyzing cases to
determine its presence. See, e.g., Flotill Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 224, 232 (9th Cir. 1966);
Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, Inc. v. FTC, 1965 Trade Cas. 71,444 (D.C. Cir. 1965), affg 57
F.T.C. 1537 (1960), modifying 56 F.T.C. 1689 (1960).
"' See note 132 supra. However, the supplier would not be able to avoid the proscriptions of §
2(d) or 2(e) by showing merely that he had no reason to know of his customers' competition. An
objective standard is imposed under these sections by which liability accrues if there is actual
competition, regardless of whether the supplier had reason to know of it. See Flotill Prods., Inc.,
[1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,970, at 22,032 (1964), affd, 35g F.2d 224,
232 (9th Cir. 1966).
'
Cf. Flotill Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 224,232 (9th Cir. 1966).
"' See National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825, 836 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd on othergrounds,
352 U.S. 419 (1957); Forster Mfg. Co., 56 F.T.C. 1633 (1959).
"'See Purex Corp., 51 F.T.C. 100, 174-77 (1954). For a discussion of area discrimination
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separate his customers and discourage their cross-selling.

Furthermore, testimony of the customers' vendees regarding their
purchasing habits may be persuasive in establishing that customers
37

are not "competing." 1
A final method of demonstrating customer distinction sufficient to
permit discriminatory promotional aid is to prove that the supplier's

subsidized vendee was not "competing" with the unfavored customers
because they performed different functional roles.'38 Functional
disparity is apparently determined by considering whether the

customers are in actual commercial rivalry regarding resale of their
purchases to the same type of buyer.'39 For example, a supplier's
customer vending only to retailers would be a wholesaler and would
not, therefore, be considered to be in competition with a retailing

purchaser who resells only to the consuming public. Thus, such
retailers and wholesalers generally have not been entitled, under

section 2(d) or 2(e), to proportionally equal promotional treatment
by their common supplier. 40 However, the Supreme Court, in Federal Trade Commission v. Fred Meyer, Inc, 4 ' has recently cast doubt

upon both the validity and practical value of this "functional role"
defense.

In Fred Meyer, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that a supplier
granting promotional aid to direct dealing retailers must, in order to
under § 2(a) see Thumann, Territorial Discrimination, Robinson-Patman, and a Rule of
ReasonableProbability,8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 363 (1961).
7
"' See Flotill Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 224, 232 (9th Cir. 1966).
"'See, e.g., Crest Auto Supplies, Inc. v. Ero Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1967); Fred
Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'don othergrounds, 390 U.S. 341 (1968);
Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 710 (9th Cir. 1964); Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Co., 56 F.T.C. 221 (1959); Elizabeth Arden, Inc., 39 F.T.C. 288 (1944), affd, 156 F.2d 132
(2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947). But see Krug v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956). See generally RowE 395-98; Kintner, note 96 supra,
at 368.
"' See Millistein, Section 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-PatmanA ct-Compulsory Uniform
Reciprocity, 37 A.B.A. ANTI-TRUST L. J. 77, 89 (1968). In deciding who "competes," judicial
analysis goes beyond the mere functional label of a supplier's customer to focus upon the
actuality of competition for the same buyer. Thus, department and variety stores may be
customers "competing" with small fabric stores handling the same product merely as an
accommodation to their public. See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 62 (1959).
Similarly, grocery wholesalers have been considered to be "competing" with specialized
institutional contract wagon distributors because both sold to the same type of buyercommercial eating establishments. See General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798, 825 (1956).
"eSeeFred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351, 354 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds,
390 U.S. 341 (1968). But see notes 156-61 infra and accompanying text.
" 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
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avoid section 2(d) liability, make proportionally equal assistance
available to those retailers who compete with the subsidized retailers
42
but indirectly purchase the supplier's products through wholesalers.
The Commission had charged Fred Meyer, a large retail chain, with

inducing its suppliers to violate section 2(d) by granting
discriminatory promotional payments.'43 The respondent contended

that its suppliers had not violated the section because the
"disfavored" customers were wholesalers and, thus, did not perform
the same functional role as did the respondent.' 41 Concomitantly, Fred

Meyer argued that those retailers with whom it was "competing"
were not entitled to promotional assistance since they, unlike Fred

Meyer, purchased from intervening wholesalers rather than directly
from the supplier. 4 Nevertheless, the FTC issued a cease-and-desist order forbidding the respondent from obtaining any promotional
aid that was unavailable to any "customers who resell to purchasers
who compete with the respondents in the resale of such supplier's

products."' 46 However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
accepted the respondent's "functional roll" defense and reversed the

Commission's ruling that a supplier has a duty, under section 2(d), to
make promotional aid available to all customers, regardless of their

divergent functional positions.'47
While superficially concurring with the Ninth Circuit's ruling that
section 2(d) imposes upon the supplier a duty to offer proportionally

equal promotional aid only to customers competing at the same
' The Supreme Court ruled "that, when a supplier gives allowances to a direct-buying
retailer, he must also make them available on comparable terms to those who buy his products
through wholesalers and compete with the direct buyer in resales." Id. at 358.
"' The Commission alleged that Fred Meyer caused its suppliers to violate § 2(d) by
requesting them to pay a fee totaling $25,000 per year for advertisement of the suppliers'
products in a coupon-book distributed by Meyer. 63 F.T.C. (1963).
11163 F.T.C. at . Compare note 139 supra and accompanying text.
,,63 F.T.C. at . See note 149 infra.
,46
63 F.T.C. at . Dissenting, Commissioner Elman argued that the promotional allowances
should be made available to retailers who competed with Fred Meyer rather than to wholesalers
reselling to these competing retailers. Id. at . This argument was accepted by the Supreme
Court. See 390 U.S. at 352.
"'See Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), in which the Court stated:
"[the Commission concedes that, to sustain the position taken by it in its opinion, we would
have to 'reconsider' our decision in Tri- Valley PackingAss'n [v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 710 (9th
Cir. 1964)]. . .where we held, on facts essentially identical with those produced here, that '[n]o
section 2(d) violation was shown as to the wholesale operation. . . because that operation was
not in functional competition with Meyer .
"Id.
I...'
at 362-63. However, the Court decided to
"adhere to the result reached [in Tri- Valley]." Id. at 363.
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functional level, 4 ' the Supreme Court rejected the lower court's

decision that only those having direct dealings with the suppliers were
encompassed by the term "customers."' 4 9 Rather, the Court

concluded that retailers purchasing the supplier's goods from
wholesalers were also "customers" of the suppliers and, since they
competed at the same functional level as Fred Meyer, were entitled to

proportionately equal promotional treatment. 50 Noting that the
legislative history of the section is inconclusive on the point,'' the

Court reasoned that expansion of the scope of section 2(d) based upon
a broader interpretation of the statutory language'52 is necessary in
order to ensure the protection of small retailers from discriminatory
benefits induced by, and granted to, large retail chains for which the

section was enacted.'53 If the Circuit Court's narrow interpretation of
"customers" were adopted, suppliers would be allowed to grant
selective promotional aid to large retailers who perform their own

wholesaling function while denying similar aid to competing small
retailers whose only access to suppliers is through wholesalers.' 54 To
" The Court noted that "§ 2(d) reaches only discrimination between customers competing for
resales at the same functional level and, therefore, does not mandate proportional equality
between

. .

. [a retailer] and.

. .

wholesalers." 390 U.S. at 349. See notes 138-39 supra and

accompanying text.
"' 390 U.S. at 354. Before Borden, a buyer was considered a "customer" under the Act only if
he either purchased directly from the supplier or if he had had such direct dealings with the
supplier, while purchasing from an intermediate distributor, to indicate that he was an "indirect
custorner" of the supplier and, thus, entitled to proportionally equal treatment. See, e.g., TriValley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 709.10 (9th Cir. 1964); American News Co. v.
FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962); K.S. Corp. v. Chemstrand
Corp., 198 F. Supp. 310, 312-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Ballantine Books, Inc., 61 F.T.C. 23, 26
(1962); Feature Publications, Inc., 61 F.T.C. 19, 22 (1962); Mercury Press, Inc., 61 F.T.C. 15,
18 (1962); Gernsback Publications, Inc., 61 F.T.C. 12, 15 (1962); Johnson Publishing Co., 61
F.T.C. 8, 11 (1962); Kay Windsor Frocks, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 89, 95-96 (1954); Luxor Inc., 31
F.T.C. 658, 662-63 (1940). See generally RoWE at 398-99; Fisher, note 94 supra, at 476-77;
Comment, 29 U. CHI. L. Ray. at 176-80. However, the Supreme Court negated the direct
contact requirement, stating "the requirement of direct dealing between supplier and disfavored
competitors. . . rests on too narrow a reading of the statute." 390 U.S. at 354.
"'See note 142 supra.
"[Nleither the Committee Report nor other parts of the legislative history

. . .

defines

'customer' to include retailers who purchase through wholesalers and compete with direct
buyers in resales." 390 U.S. at 352.
12

See note 149 supra.

This was described as "Congress' clearly stated intent." 390 U.S. at 352.
The Court concluded that "a narrower reading of § 2(d) would lead to the following
anomolous result. . . . [D]irect-buying retailers like Meyer, who resell large quantities of their
suppliers' products and therefore find it feasible to undertake the traditional wholesaling
functions for themselves, would be protected by the provision from the granting of
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avoid this anomalous result, the Court decided that section 2(d) had
been violated by Fred Meyer's suppliers' failure to offer promotional
assistance to the retailers purchasing through wholesalers.' 55
While the Court did not directly challenge the functional level
defense,1 6 the practical value of the defense seems effectively

debilitated by the imposition of a duty upon a supplier to offer
promotional assistance to subsequent, indirect purchasers of his
goods who are at the same functional level as direct customers
receiving subsidization. 7 While prior to Fred Meyer, Inc., a
respondent-supplier could permanently avoid section 2(d) or 2(e)

liability for promotional discrimination between customers by proof
that the vendees performed different functional roles,' the functional
level defense now may be only of temporary effectiveness. Thus, the
decision indicates that a supplier is apparently free of the

"availability" requirements of section 2(d) or 2(e) only so long as his
products are not, after the initial direct sale to different functional
levels, resold to buyers "competing at the same level as any of the
subsidized supplier's vendees."' 59 However, the decision fails to
delineate the degree of knowledge which must be possessed by the

supplier before the enhanced duty under section 2(d) is imposed. It
remains unclear whether the supplier must have actual knowledge of
the later transfer, seemingly the factual situation in Fred Meyer,
Inc., '" or merely must have reason to know of the transfer, or will be

charged with knowledge of the transfer in all cases. Arguably, if the
discriminatory promotional allowances to their direct-buying competitors. On the other hand,
small retailers whose only access to suppliers is through independent wholesalers would not be
entitled to this protection." 390 U.S. at 352. This result was seen to "be diametrically opposed
." to Congress' purpose in enacting § 2(d). Id.
Us However, the Court attempted to limit the precedential effect of Fred Meyer, Inc., stating
that "it would be both inappropriate and unwise to attempt to formulate an all-embracing rule
applying the elusive language of the section to every system of distribution a supplier might
devise . ... 390 U.S. at 357. Rather, the Court indicated that the decision was limited to "the
concrete facts here presented .... Id.
116See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
"I However, this "new" duty is presumably also limited by the passage of time, see notes 12531 supra and accompanying text, the presence'of geographic barriers between direct and indirect
purchasers, see notes 132-37 supra and accompanying text, and the requirements of like grade
and quality. See notes 111-24 supraand accompanying text.
"' See note 138 supra.
"' See notes 142 & 149 supra and accompanying text.
"' The Court of Appeals indicated that the suppliers in Fred Meyer not only had knowledge
that they were selling to wholesalers who bought for the purpose of resale but also that the
supplier knew to whom these wholesalers resold. See 359 F.2d at 365-66.
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supplier's duty operates upon either of the latter two standards, the
administrative cost and difficulties inherent in a continuing
surveillance regarding ownership of his products will significantly
discourage a supplier's propensity to make any offers of promotional
assistance where there is a mere possibility of distributive resale.'6'
On the other hand, the substantive holding of Fred Meyer, Inc.,
may be less significant to the respondent preparing a defense to
sections 2(d) and 2(e) allegations than is the Court's method of analysis in reaching the holding. While ostensibly basing their ruling
upon an extraordinarily broad interpretation of "customers,"' 62 the
Court actually seems to have decided the case by engaging in an economic analysis of the ramifications of the various alternative holdings in light of the primary purpose of section 2(d) to improve the
competitive position of small retailers. 63 Moreover, once having
"6,
The Court suggested that a supplier might make the promotional

offers required under the

decision by "utilizing his wholesalers to distribute payments or administer a promotional
program, so long as the supplier takes responsibility . . . for seeing that the allowances are
made available to all who compete in the resale of his product." 390 U.S. at 358. See note 101
supra and accompanying text. However, the extreme difficulties of such a system were outlined
in the oral arguments before the Court: "Faced with a case where the supplier is forced to pay an
allowance to the wholesaler. . . it would be impossible to do all the things that the FTC would
require [the wholesaler] to do. The wholesaler would have to find out which retailers compete
with the direct-buying retailer and how to proportionalize it, and then he has to determine
whether the plan is suitable for the small retailer to use . . . .The wholesaler would have to
collect the money and pass it on, see that it's used and if not used, see that it is remitted."
36 U.S.L.W. at 3198.

The compensation that wholesalers would require to perform this "impossible" task might so
increase the cost of the promotion as to make it prohibitive. Similarly, if the supplier attempts to
perform those administrative tasks outlined above and the additional task of establishing a
liason with the intermediate distributor to trace the supplier's goods from that distributor to
their ultimate buyer, the cost in time and money may be much greater than the expected return
from the promotion granted.
62See note 149 supra and accompanying text.
.63
See note 153 supra and accompanying text. The Court's analysis focused upon the "central
purpose of § 2(d) and the economic realities with which its framers were concerned." 390 U.S. at
349. This "central purpose," as defined by the Court, was "to improve the competitive position
of small retailers by eliminating [discriminatory promotional allowances]." Id. at 352. The
"economic realities" with which the Court was concerned seem to have been the competitive
effects upon these "small retailers" of the promotional aid granted Fred Meyer. The'Court
stated "it is clear that the direct impact of Meyer's receiving discriminatory promotional
allowances is felt by the disfavored retailers with whom Meyer competes in resales." Id. at 357.
Indeed, the basis of the Court's extraordinary interpretation of "customers," see note 149 supra
and accompanying text, is that "[w]hether suppliers deal directly with the disfavored
competitors or not, they can, and here did, afford a direct buyer the kind of competitive
advantage which § 2(d) was intended to eliminate." 390 U.S. at 354.
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viewed the economic realities, the Court limited its decision to the
factual circumstances presented, explicitly refusing to set forth a
general rule. 6 This ad hoc approach represents a significant
departure from the courts' and Commission's general refusal to
consider the economic effects of an alleged violation or of their
decision. 65 Rather, analysis has been primarily confined to a literal
interpretation of the rather poorly drafted statutory language. 6 6 Thus,
perhaps the most important ultimate aspect of Fred Meyer, Inc., may
be to influence affirmatively application of an economically realistic
analysis resulting in invocation of sections 2(d) and 2(e) only when the
facts presented indicate that a competitive injury to the small retailer
6
is likely.' 1
The statutory prerequisite to application of section 2(d) or
2(e) that there be "competing" customers-interpreted as customers
purchasing at a reasonably simultaneous time, reselling goods of like
grade and quality, at the same functional level within the same
geographic market-is a necessary and reasonable qualification of the
statutory proscriptions upon indirect price rebates. Since the purpose
of these prohibitions is to protect the small retailer rather than
to preclude all promotional subsidization, the statute should logically
operate to accomplish its narrow end without restraining commerical transactions which do not affect the small retailer's
competitive position. 6 ' Consequently, the respondent's ability
to defend against a section 2(d) or 2(e) allegation by proving
the absence of any of the above definitional elements of a "competing customer," and thereby establishing that his subsidized
customer does not, in fact, compete with any other customer who
'"See note 155 supra.
'~'

See note 92 supra.

'"See, e.g., FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959); R.H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326
F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964); Vanity Fair Paper Mill, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962);
Alexander Miner Sales Corp., 61 F.T.C. 1317 (1962); Johnson Publishing Co., 61 F.T.C. 8
(1962); Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1535 (1956).
"I'See note 168 infra and accompanying text.
16S
While recognizing the Act's purpose in "protect [ing]. . .certain elements in the business
community [the small individual competitor] against the effective price and service competition
of others," Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National
Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. Rav. 1139, 1200 (1952), a leading commentator has suggested
that the Robinson-Patman Act be "applicable to the prohibition of price and service
discriminations only where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly at any level of competition . . . ...
Id. at 1202. Thus, it was suggested that actionable "[d]iscrimination arising from failure of the seller to offer comparable payments or
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would be adversely affected, is an effective means of attaining the
proper discriminatory application of the statute. Moreover, the
undifferentiated enforcement which might otherwise ensue would

seem inconsistent with the general regulatory policy of interfering
with free business enterprise only when deleterious effects upon
competition are either probable or certain. '9 Arguably, equivalent
justifications could be advanced for a sub silentio extension of the
same stringent competitive injury defense to the brokerage clause.
There seems to be no compelling economic rationale in support of
more severe treatment of section 2(c) violators since dummy
brokerage and discriminatory promotional assistance are equally
invidious in their ultimate effect, a competitively advantageous
reduction of the selected customer's costs. However, section 2(c)'s
textual silence regarding the "competing" requirement'70 and the
resulting general refusal of the FTC and the courts to consider the
possible competitive effects of selective brokerage payments' may be
explained by the surreptitious element present in 2(c) violations, the
services or facilities to all of his customers on equal terms would depend upon whether the
effect may be substantially to lessen competition." Id. at 1207. More recently, Commissioner
Elman has concluded that "[t]he utility of a per se approach [of section 2(d) and 2(e)] remains
highly doubtful, at the very least." See Elman, The Robinson-Patman Act and Anti-Trust
Policy: A Time for Reappraisal,42 WASH. L. REV. I, 27 (1966). See also ATT'Y GEN. REP.
189-90.
6'See. e.g., ATT'Y GEN. REP. 191-92; C. EDWARDS, THE PRIcE DISCRIMINATION LAW 627-57
(1959); Elman, note 168 supra,at 2-4; Oppenheim, note 168 supra,at 1198-1210.
Thegeneral antitrustpolicy embodied in the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964), § 5 ofthe
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), and sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 14 & 18 (1964), has been described as that of "hard competition," allowing market
pressures, including relative bargaining power, to operate freely unless they substantiallyinjure
competition or tend to create monopoly. See Oppenheim, note 168 supra, at 1198-1203.
However, the Robinson-Patman Act's policy has been seen as "soft competition," restraining
activities that injure the position of a selected member of the economy, the individual
competitor. Id. at 1201. In order to make sections 2(d) and 2(e) more consistent with this policy,
the ablution of these sections has been advocated. See note 84 supra.
170See note 4 supra.
171See, e.g., Robinson v. Stanley Home Prods., Inc., 272 F.2d 601, 604 (1st Cir. 1959);
Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607, 609-10 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774

(1945). It has been contended that "§ 2(c) is the only substantive section which does not deal

with the discriminatory treatment of two or more competitors. Since no question of
discrimination exists, and since the offense does not even require the presence of competitors,
competitive injury can have no relevance in a § 2(c) case." Note, 68 YALE L.J. 808, 824 n.87
(1959). But see Rill, Brokerage Under the Robinson-PatmanAct: Toward a New Certainly,41
NOTRE DAME LAW. 337, 348 (1966). On the other hand, it has been suggested that like grade and
quality, geographic proximity, and functional level should be considered in brokerage violations
to determine whether the disadvantaged buyers are in competition with the favored buyer. Id.
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sham brokerage practices engaged in to deceive others as to the actual
price paid for the suppliers' goods, which is not usually evident in
sections 2(d), 2(e), or 2(a) violations.'
Although failing to effectuate the section 2(d) and 2(e) defenses
by proof that the promotional aids granted were not discriminatory
because accorded on proportionally equal terms or that actual
competitive injury was impossible, a respondent may nevertheless

avoid section 2(e) charges by proving that his promotional grants
were a good faith effort to meet competition, the defense provided by

section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act.'73 However, the
burdensome evidentiary requirements conditioning the utilization of
this defense in section 2(a) litigation have been extended to section 2(e)

cases, causing operation of the defense to depend upon possession of
extensive information regarding the competitor's activities.'7 4 Thus,

because the gravamen of the defense is that a supplier's actions were
merely responsive to promotional offers of his competitors, the

respondent must establish that he had knowledge of his competitor's
offer of promotional benefits.' 75 Although not required, a supplier
I72
Unlike a section 2(a), 2(d), or 2(e) violation, "[t]he gist of the violation under section 2(c) is
not that discriminatory prices have been charged, but that the parties have engaged in a practice
designed to deceive others as to the price charged and paid, whether or not discriminatory." FTC
v. Washington Fish &Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39, 44 (9th Cir. 1959). But see notes 27-33 supra and
accompanying text. Since this invidious intent element of a section 2(c) violation has been cited
as the reason that a "meeting competition" defense is not available to those charged under the
brokerage clause, Blackford, A Survey and Commentary on the Good Faith Meeting of
Competition Defense in the Robinson-Patman Act, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 753, 757-58 (1967), it

may also be the cause of the unwillingness of the courts to consider the competitive impact of
brokerage violations.
"I Section 2(b) provides that "a seller [may rebut a] prima facie case.., by showing that his
lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to anypurchaser or purchasers was made in
good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a
competitor." Robinson-Patman Act § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964). The Supreme Court has
recognized the section 2(b) defense as a complete defense to Robinson-Patman charges. FTC v.
Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1958). See generally RowE 207-64, 416-20; Austern,
Presumptionand PersipienceAbout Competitive Effect UnderSection 2 of the Clayton Act, 81

HARV. L. REv. 773, 810-17 (1968); Blackford, note 172 supra; Elman, note 168 supra, at
16-21; Kintner, MerchandisingAllowances and Services: Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-PatmanAct, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 364, 369-70 (1966).
"I Blackford has warned that "[i]f
the Commission adheres to its present interpretation as to
the type and sufficiency of evidence required of a seller to sustain his burden of proof, then for all
practical purposes the good faith meeting of competition defense is not a viable means of
justifying a discriminatory practice in an FTC proceeding." Blackford, note 172 supra, at 771.
The FTC has stated that "this is a very technical defense subject to important limitations." FTC
Guides § 240.14.
"I According to the Supreme Court "the statute at least requires the seller, who has knowingly
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might bolster the argument that his actions were strictly defensive by
delaying his retaliatory action until he has suffered actual competitive

injury.

'

Moreover, it is generally required that the promotional

assistance provided not exceed that offered by the supplier's

competitors.'" Therefore, the respondent must know the specifics of
his competitor's schemes of assistance and be able to show that the

amount of subsidy or the cost of services which he provides is not
greater than that granted by his competitors. Finally, the section 2(b)
defense operates to justify only reaction to legal competition.' If it is

determined that a reasonably prudent supplier should have known that
the promotional offers made by his competitors were illegal, the

Commission will refuse to condone discriminatory aid as necessary
to meet competition.'7 9 However, this "legality" requirement has been

discriminated in price, to show the existence of facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent
person to believe that the granting of a lower price would in fact meet the equally low price of a
competitor." FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759-60 (1945); accord, Continental
Baking Co., No. 7630 (F.T.C., December 31, 1963). However, the respondent is not required
to demonstrate knowledge of the specific terms of a competitor's offer. See Forster Mfg. Co.
v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 55-56 (Ist Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965); cJ. Callaway Mills v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1966).
176Cf. Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966) (respondent waited five years
before relinquishing to pressure and meeting competitors' discounts). See also Continental
Baking Co., No. 7630 (F.T.C., December 31, 1963).
'" A section 2(b) defense has been disallowed where the Courts have determined that the seller
has attempted to gain new customers rather than merely retain his present customers by offering
lower prices than those of his competitors. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 24142, 249 (1951); Standard Motors Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 826 (1959); Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1036, 1045-46 (1960), modified,
301 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962). Contra, Sunshine Biscuit, Inc.
v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962). Presumably, this same requirement of "meeting not
beating" a competitor's offer applies equally in defense to section 2(d) or 2(e).
This limitation upon the section 2(b) defense has been criticized as contrary to the
fundamental goal of other antitrust legislation, Blackford, note 172 supra, and "inconsistent
with the Sherman Act which makes it a per se offense to allocate customers or to attempt to
monopolize your own customers." Austern, note 173 supra at 816. Thus, it has been suggested
that aggressive pricing practices, presumably including promotional aid, be allowed in meeting
competition unless the seller had both the intent and the economic power to destroy rather than
merely injure his competition. Blackford, note 172 supra, at 778.
" The Supreme Court has stated that the competitor's price that could be met would be a
"lawful lower price." Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 238, 242, 252 (1951). See
generally RowE 220-30.
"' See, e.g., Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n, 60 F.T.C. 1134, 1172 (1962), rev'd on othergrounds,
329 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964); E. Edelman & Co., 51 F.T.C. 978 (1955), affd, 239 F.2d 152 (7th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958); Standard Motors Prods., Inc., 54 F.T.C. 814
(1957), affd, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,361 U.S. 826 (1959).
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criticized as unreasonable since it requires a supplier to judge
the propriety of his own acts upon speculation concerning the legality

of his competitors' operations based upon facts to which access is
extremely difficult.' Consequently, several courts have promulgated
a more lenient "legality" requirement than that favored by the FTC
under which the section 2(b) "meeting competition" defense is rejected
only if the respondent has actual knowledge or must have known that
his competitor's actions are illegal."'" Moreover, it has been suggested
that, because of the onerous burden of speculation, the legality of a
competitor's offer should not be considered unless the Commission
82
finds a reciprocal collusive agreement between the suppliers.'
Although the scope of the "meeting competition" defense has
traditionally been limited to sections 2(a) and 2(e),' 83 several recent
decisions have held the defense available to those charged under
However, the Attorney General's Report, fully cited note 17 supra, did not "interpret the
Supreme Court's [Standard Oil] decision as establishing such lawfulness as an absolute
condition in every section 2(b) . . .defense [but] [riather. . .[as merely] exclud[ing] a price
established pursuant to a conspiracy or an illegal single basing-point system, or otherwise
unrelated to potential differences in the rival seller's costs." ATT'Y GEN. REP. at 182. See notes
181 -82 infra and accompanying text.
11 In the competitive market situation, the seller faced with a competitor's promotional offer
is required by the reasonable-man rule to speculate as to whether his competitor has met the
requirements of proportional equal treatment, see notes 97-110 supraand accompanying text, of
all competing customers. See notes 111-72 supra and accompanying text. This speculation has
been described as "especially onerous for the private litigant who is not armed with the
investigatory powers of the FTC . . ." and as "a costly proposition." See Blackford, note 172
supra, at 763. Thus, it seems clear that "[a] businessman who operates in the haste and pressures
of the market cannot always prophesy whether the competitor's price [or promotional offer]
which he must meet may later be held unlawful; nor is the overall antitrust policy furthered by
information exchange programs to spread such knowledge among competitors." ATr'y GEN.
REP. 182. See also Austern, note 173 supra, at 814-16.
"I See Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1956). Moreover, courts have shown
greater leniency as to the legality requirement in distinguishing between an illegal system and an
individual offer. Although meeting competition is not available in meeting a system, see, e.g.,
FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746,753 (1945); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S.
726, 735 (1945), there are indications that some courts will allow a supplier to "meet"
individual illegal competitive offers. See Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d
356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956); Dean Milk Co. v. American Processing &
Sales Co., 1950-1951 TRADE CAS. 64,301 (N.D. I11. 1951).
'See Blackford, note 172 supra, at 778.
In Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1535 (1956), the Commission first ruled that "meeting
competition" was not a defense to section 2(d). Id. at 1552. Finding the legislative history of the
Act inconclusive, id. at 1551, the Commission narrowly interpreted the text of section 2(b), see
note 173 supra, ruling that the defense was unavailable to a section 2(d) defendant because
neither "payments" nor "allowances" were mentioned as justifiable in section 2(b). Id. at
1552; accord, Admiral Corp., 55 F.T.C. 2078 (1959); J.H. Filbert, Inc-, 54 F.T.C. 359, 364
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section 2(d).1 4 Restriction of the section 2(b) defense to sections 2(a)

and 2(e) was based upon a strict literal interpretation of section 2(b)'s
description of the actions that might be justified as "meeting
competition." The word "furnishing" was interpreted to include only

the direct grants of promotional services or facilities described in
section 2(e) and not payments for promotion under section 2(d).18 '
However, the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act

indicates that the bill contained only section 2(d) at the time section
2(b) was adopted. 86 Thus, several courts have inferred that sections
2(d) and 2(e) are companionate and that section 2(b) necessarily is
available to both."7 Arguably, extension of the section 2(b) defense to

section 2(d) is correct since little reason appears for differential
treatment in light of the fact that the sections are violated by
substantively equivalent activities and that the customer cost

mitigation effect is identical under section 2(d) or 2(e).'8

Further-

more, application of section 2(b) to both sections 2(d) and 2(e) seems

economically justified since the unavailability of a "meeting competition" defense may result in operation of the promotional provisions
to favor unduly the large, vertically integrated company over smaller
non-integrated suppliers and customers. For example, where commer(1957); cf. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667, 677 (3d Cir. 1939) (dictum),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940).
'. Shulton, Inc. v. FTC, 305 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1962); Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC,
301 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See generally Note, 48 VA. L. REV. 574 (1962); 30 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 769 (1962); 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 473 (1962).
See authority cited in note 183 supra.
'"The District of Columbia Circuit noted that "as the bill passed the Senate. . .it included
(1) our present Subsection (d) . . .;(2) a separate subsection making unlawful any

discrimination in discounts, rebates, allowances, or advertising service charges; and (3)the meetcompetition defense . .

.

. [T]he bill . . . contained no Subsection (e) or any equivalent

thereof." 301 F.2d at 504.
"' "Thus there can be no doubt whatsoever that, so far as the Senate was concerned, the
proviso in Subsection (b)applied to discriminations in compensation or allowances made to
customers for services or facilities furnished by them, as now provided in Subsection (d); there
was nothing else in the bill for this language to apply to [sic]." Id.; accord,Shulton, Inc. v. FTC,
305 F.2d 36, 38 (7th Cir. 1962); Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499, 502 (D.C.
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962) (where the previous strict interpretation of section 2(b) was described as "unrealistic").
"I "In the typical situation concerning advertising services, it does not matter which party
'furnished' the services since the expense ultimately will fall on the seller even though the
customer enjoys some of the resulting benefits. Thus, the economic effect of the transaction is
identical whether the seller pays for the services directly or indirectly. . . .[lit is submitted that
competition is not fostered by preferring one type of discrimination over another closely related
form of economic favoritism." Note, 48 VA. L. REV. 574, 595 (1962).
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cially independent suppliers and customers conjunctively compete with
a vertically integrated enterprise, the integrated company may gain
competitive advantage by using promotional programs that the individual customers cannot afford. Since the independent supplier would
not be permitted, absent the availability of a "meeting competition"
defense, to provide promotional assistance to the particular customers
disadvantaged without simultaneously extending identical aid to all
customers throughout the market area, an endeavor likely requiring
expenditures exceeding the benefits returned to the supplier, the integrated company's scheme would remain unchallenged. Consequently,
the individual customer might lose sales volume to the integrated
company and perhaps be driven from business by an effective promotional campaign.8 9 Thus, in order effectively to attain the goal of
protecting the small customer espoused by sections 2(d) and 2(e), the
"meeting competition" defense should be available to suppliers
granting assistance within the terms of either section. 90
A trend, similar to that apparent in recent section 2(c) decisions,
toward extending section 2(a) defenses to sections 2(d) and 2(e) is
developing.19' The elements of a violation of section 2(d) or 2(e) and,
conversely, the gist of their defenses, are similar to those of section
2(a). Under each provision, discrimination and the possibility of
consequent competitive injury are required to establish a violation.
However, unlike section 2(a), these elements are presumed under
2(d) and 2(e).192 Thus, as a matter of defense, the burden is upon the
respondent to rebut these presumptions by establishing that there
were no "competing" customers or that his promotional benefits were
accorded in equal proportion. The practical difficulties of this rebuttal
seems to fulfill the Congressional goal of encouraging parties to
restrict their discriminatory activities to section 2(a) price
differentials'93 where the Commission bears the burden of establishing
19

Cf. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963).

'

It seems that the Commission has finally recognized the validity and necessity of the

extension of the section 2(b) defense to section 2(d) for it now advises that "[a] seller charged

with discrimination in violation of section 2(d) or section 2(e) may defend his actions by showing
that the payments were made or the services were furnished in good faith to meet equally high
payments or equivalent services paid or furnished by a competitor." FTC Guides § 240.14
(emphasis added).

...
See notes 81-88 supra and accompanying text.
See Simplicity Pattern Co. v. FTC, 360 U.S. 55 (1959); note 16 supra.
'

See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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the elements of injury and discrimination. 94' At the same time, the
respondent is at least afforded an opportunity to avoid the sections by
showing that his actions were innocent. Further, the extension of an
effective "meeting competition" defense to both sections 2(d) and 2(e)
represents an astute recognition of the economic necessity of
retaliation in a competitive economy. 95'
CONCLUSION

There is reason for some optimism upon the part of a respondent
charged under section 2(c), 2(d), or 2(e) since the Federal Trade
Commission and some courts are apparently becoming more
economically realistic in allowing justifications for prima facie
violations of these sections. However, it would be misleading to
suggest that the utilization of the described defenses will certainly be
successful. The fluctuating composition of the Commission will
continue to affect, if not determine, its acceptance of a particular
defense. Moreover, the courts continue to differ among themselves
and with the Federal Trade Commission as to the specific elements
required for, and in their general sympathy toward, the economically
justified defenses. Thus, the future effectiveness of sections 2(c), 2(d),
and 2(e) defenses remains impervious to valid generalization.

'"See generally Blackford, A Survey of Section 2(a) oftheRobinson-PatmanAct, 41 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 285, 295-99 (1966).

"IIndicating the necessity of spontaneity in this retaliation, Austern, Isn't 30 Years Enough,
30 A.B.A. Anti-Trust L.J. 1 (1966) warns: "If the meeting competition defense is to have any
practical meaning, it must be given a flexible interpretation enabling sellers to act promptly in

response to the exigencies of competition. Sensitivity to the realities of everyday commercial life,
not rigid standards imposing unrealistic and impossible duties of inquiry and prediction on the
businessmen, is essential if the defense is to have any substance. Pragmatism, not strict logic
must be the keynote of interpretation."Id. at 17 (emphasis added).

